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Appellate panel hears argument in State v. Williams over DNA testing request
Summary
At oral argument in State v. Williams, defense counsel asked the panel to reverse a trial court denial and order post‑conviction DNA testing, arguing that exculpatory results should be presumed and weighed against trial evidence; the state urged remand or denial, citing a receipt with the defendant's bloody thumbprint.
An appellate panel heard arguments in State v. Williams on whether the trial court erred by denying a post‑conviction motion for DNA testing that defense counsel says could prove the defendant's innocence.
"Mr. Williams has spent the last 18 years in prison for a crime that he has always maintained that he did not commit," defense attorney Kalyn Lovrovich told the court, asking it to reverse the motion court's order and to apply the statutory presumption in favor of exculpatory DNA results. Lovrovich said the defense seeks testing of the victim's fingernail clippings, the sexual‑assault kit and swabs from the victim's truck "in areas where the driver would have touched," arguing that a single, non‑Williams profile across those items would be highly exculpatory.
Lovrovich emphasized that she was not asking the court to find Mr. Williams innocent now, but to "presume exculpatory results" as the statute and precedents require and then weigh those presumed results against the trial record to determine whether testing should be ordered.
State Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Theodore Promptly responded that the trial court reviewed briefing and transcripts and did not abuse its discretion in denying testing. The prosecutor told the panel that evidence presented at trial—particularly a convenience‑store receipt found inside the victim's vehicle with the defendant's bloody thumbprint—constituted direct evidence linking the defendant to the victim in the critical time window. "Only the assailant could have had that," the prosecutor said in describing the receipt.
Panel members probed a central procedural question: whether an appellate court should remand to the trial court with instructions to apply the presumption or whether the appellate court may apply the presumption itself and decide entitlement to testing. Lovrovich pointed to prior opinions she said the appellate courts used to apply the presumption and order testing; state counsel urged remand if this court concludes the trial court's ruling was insufficiently articulated.
The judges also discussed the statutory standard and precedent. The panel noted that some cases contain mixed language about remedy—reversing and remanding while discussing, in the opinion text, the result the trial court should reach—and questioned whether those opinions authorized an appellate court to order testing absent a clearer trial‑court record.
The parties debated evidentiary specifics. Lovrovich told the court the record does not directly place Mr. Williams at the scene in the ways that DNA evidence would, and she argued there are plausible explanations—transfer or processing proximity—for how the receipt might have come to be in the victim's truck. The prosecutor responded that the trial evidence, including the receipt and other circumstantial indicators of motive and opportunity, would still outweigh an exculpatory DNA profile under the statute's high "innocence" standard.
The panel heard argument but made no on‑the‑record ruling; the court recessed to consider the matter in chambers.
The appeal raises two discrete procedural questions for the panel: whether the absence of an explicit presumption in the trial court's order requires reversal, and, if so, whether the appellate court should itself apply the presumption and order testing or remand to the trial court with instructions to do so.
