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Defense urges court to read Washingtons repeat-voting law narrowly; state urges broader reach
Summary
At oral argument in Other Court, defense attorney Gregory Lehi asked judges to reverse James Anthony Padrutas conviction, arguing Washingtons repeated-voting statute penalizes voting more than once for the same slate of candidates, not merely casting ballots in different states. The states attorney, Sarah Taggart, urged a commonsense reading that covers voting in this state and another at any election.
At oral argument in Other Court, defense attorney Gregory Lehi asked a panel of judges to reverse the conviction of James Anthony Padruta, arguing Washingtons repeated-voting statute does not "criminalize merely casting ballots in different states" but instead punishes voting more than once "in any election" only when the votes are for the same slate of candidates or issues.
"RCW 9 29 a 84 6 50 does not criminalize merely voting twice or, excuse me, merely casting ballots in different states even when that occurs close in time," Lehi told the court, saying the state had not proven that Padruta voted for the same slate in both states.
The court pressed Lehi on statutory definitions and timing. One judge asked "where in the statutes, or any other basis do we have to focus on the candidates and issues?" noting the statutory definition that treats "election" as "general election." Lehi urged the panel to use the dictionary definition of "election" as a choice among candidates or issues and warned that a broader, temporal reading could raise constitutional concerns.
The states attorney, Sarah Taggart, replied that repeated voting is "the casting of 2 ballots in any election" and said the statutes phrase "any election" was intended to simplify coverage of primary, general and special elections. "Statutes are to be construed, so no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or unenforceable," Taggart said, arguing a narrow interpretation would render the second clause meaningless.
Taggart pointed to related statutory provisions governing voter registration and auditors' duties (transcribed in argument as "RCW 29A08-one 135" and "RCW 29 8 0 4 1 51") and to legislative history and prior case law from Arizona as context for the state's reading. She told the court that repeated voting has been illegal in Washington since territorial times and that the state had presented what she characterized as sufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to convict.
Bench members and counsel debated practical consequences. Judges questioned whether a broad interpretation would criminalize people who moved between states and later voted in Washington; Taggart said the statute requires an intentional act and that legislative choices (and subsequent amendments in other states) supported the state's position. Lehi countered that the rule of lenity and a focus on overlapping candidate choice provided a reasonable, narrower construction.
Lehi closed by asking the court to reverse and dismiss the conviction. The panel thanked counsel, took the cases under advisement to consider them in chambers, and adjourned.
The oral argument record includes the defenses repeated emphasis on a slate-of-candidates interpretation and the states emphasis on a timing/"any election" reading; the court did not announce a decision at the hearing.
