Alaska lawmakers probe privacy and legal risks after state sent unredacted voter list to DOJ

The House Judiciary Committee, joined by the House State Affairs Committee, convened March 2 to examine why Alaska provided an unredacted electronic copy of its statewide voter registration list to the U.S. Department of Justice in December 2025 and whether that disclosure complied with state law.

Chair Representative Grama said the hearing would explore whether the transmission — which included full names, dates of birth, residential addresses, and either Alaska driver’s‑license numbers or the last four digits of Social Security numbers — was lawful and what Alaskans can do if their information is misused.

The first witness, attorney Libby Bakler, told lawmakers that Alaska traditionally controls election administration and that the state’s privacy protections merit close scrutiny. "This process effectively turns Alaska's independent voter‑list maintenance process into an audit and referendum by the federal government," Bakler said, arguing the MOU and DOJ review could disenfranchise Alaskans if the state ceded control without clear legal authority.

Paul Manson, research director for the Elections and Voting Information Center, described technical limits of federal cross‑checks such as the SAVE/USCIS pipeline and matching challenges across disparate state databases. He said non‑matches are not definitive proof of ineligibility and cautioned against acting on automated mismatches without local review. "When we see a non‑match ... often non‑matches are driven by some sort of clerical input error and not necessarily finding some sort of malicious intent," Manson testified.

Network security consultant Leon Himas testified to specific cybersecurity and privacy risks in the memorandum of understanding. He told the committees the agreement placed confidential personally identifiable information into at least three systems — state systems, the DOJ’s Justice Enterprise File Sharing system (JEFS) and the DOJ Civil Rights Division index (CRT‑001) — and flagged several red flags: a rushed timeline, limited state oversight or audit rights, ambiguous breach‑notification language, and no guaranteed deletion (the MOU contemplates permanent archiving). "Because these are immutable identifiers ... there will always be a breach risk even if the state of Alaska is deleting the data from its own systems," Himas said.

Division of Elections Director Carol Beecher and Rachel Witte, civil division director at the Department of Law, told the joint committees the agencies evaluated DOJ’s request under state law and relied on AS 15.07.195(c)(1), which permits disclosure to federal agencies for governmental purposes where federal authority exists. Witte said the DOJ sought the data under the enforcement provisions of the National Voter Registration Act and that the division cooperated after legal review. Beecher said the confidential file included condition codes/date, private residential addresses (where voters had elected privacy), date of birth, and either the last four of Social Security numbers or a driver’s‑license number when the SSN was not on file.

Committee members pressed officials on why Alaska complied when some states refused, whether the MOU limits DOJ use of the data, whether the MOU allows state audits of DOJ security controls, and whether the state had received any DOJ notices requiring voter‑list corrections (Beecher said the division had not received any such notices since transmitting the list in December). Witte said she could provide the committees with the legal basis supporting the decision but declined to share confidential attorney‑client advice provided to the agencies.

Former Alaska Attorney General Bruce Botello told the committee the MOU was "ultra vires" and beyond the lieutenant governor’s authority, urged the legislature to obtain and publish legal analyses from the Department of Law, proposed a resolution or statute to bar future unredacted sharing, and recommended considering litigation to block DOJ‑directed purges. "By accepting DOJ oversight of list maintenance ... the lieutenant governor has effectively bound the state of Alaska to follow federal instructions on who may remain registered without legislative standards," Botello said.

Former Lieutenant Governor Lauren Lehman said she likely would have followed Department of Law advice at the time but expressed concern about retention risk in DOJ archives. Dr. Erica Franz, a political scientist who studies democratic backsliding, warned that expanded executive access to voter data can enable pre‑election manipulations or intimidation and urged transparency about intended uses and safeguards.

Several lawmakers noted Alaska’s unique addressing and residency patterns, the state’s heavy reliance on the Permanent Fund Dividend application for automatic registration contacts, and improvements the division has made to reduce over‑enrollment. Members also confirmed that private residential addresses marked for privacy were included in the confidential file provided to DOJ.

Committee counsel said staff can draft statutory changes to tighten AS 15.07.195. Legislative counsel suggested drafting a bill modeled on stronger privacy statutes in other states. No formal votes or directives were taken during the hearing; chairs signaled interest in additional oversight, production of legal analyses, and possible legislation to strengthen confidentiality and clarify when and how confidential voter data may be disclosed.

The committees adjourned after nearly two hours of testimony. The most immediate next steps identified by members were obtaining the Department of Law’s legal reasoning for the disclosure, reviewing the MOU language on retention and breach notification, and considering statutory reforms to limit future unredacted disclosures.