Defense argues accomplice mens rea was misdefined for Saite; State says evidence supports intent

Dane Smollen, counsel for the defendant in State v. Saite, told the Utah Court of Appeals that the accomplice-liability instruction given at trial failed to define the required secondary mental state: what an accomplice must have known or intended would result from their actions. "For my client, accomplice liability was really the operative instruction," Smollen said, arguing the instruction should have explained that an accomplice must have known or intended that the actor's conduct would result in a felony discharge.

Smollen also argued that allowing recklessness without a legal definition risked a lay juror using a colloquial sense of recklessness ("not thinking about consequences") to convict, where the correct criminal standard requires conscious disregard of a substantial risk. He pointed to the jury's question at trial about how accomplice liability applies to the felony-discharge offense as evidence the jury was confused about the instruction.

The State replied that the evidence at trial (DNA on a recovered weapon, video placing defendants in particular seats, text messages about the target and prior incidents, and gang-intelligence testimony) supported intentional or knowing conduct and that the instruction's references to intentional/knowing/reckless discharge were consistent with precedent. The State emphasized that the prejudice inquiry under Strickland and related authority should resolve the case: because the record strongly supports conviction, any instructional imprecision did not produce a reasonable probability of a different result.

Smollen asked the court to remand for further proceedings or to reverse where the faulty instruction and omission of an accomplice mens-rea definition could have affected even a single juror's assessment under Strickland. The court took the matter under advisement and will issue a decision.