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Court of Appeals weighs lesser‑included instruction, blood-draw warrant language and preservation in Allen appeal
Summary
In State v. Michael Lee Allen, the court heard arguments over whether the trial court erred by denying a lesser-included-offense instruction, whether the statute requires a warrant that authorizes both drawing and testing blood for the chemical-test refusal offense, and whether preservation rules permit post-trial sufficiency challenges by motion to arrest judgment.
The Utah Court of Appeals heard oral argument in State v. Michael Lee Allen on whether the trial court erred by denying a lesser-included-offense instruction, whether a warrant in a refusal-to-submit case must explicitly authorize both the draw and the test of blood, and whether a motion to arrest judgment preserved a sufficiency/preservation argument.
Appellant counsel Wendy Brown argued the denial of a lesser-included instruction was prejudicial and not harmless. Brown emphasized that the state's own witnesses (including an officer’s body-worn camera testimony) left room for the jury to convict of a lesser offense and relied on Baker to explain why a missing lesser-included instruction can materially affect jury decision-making.
Judges challenged which elements in the statutes raise pure legal questions and which are fact questions for a jury — particularly whether the defendant’s stated intent and driving conduct could reasonably be found to be an attempt to flee or to be conduct done for safety. Brown pressed that slowing and seeking witnesses is different from an intent to permanently escape law enforcement and that the presence of ambiguous facts supports submitting a lesser offense to jurors.
Brown also argued a separate statutory element required careful reading: the code’s phrasing “draw and test” means the legislature intended a warrant to authorize both the blood draw and subsequent laboratory testing, so a warrant omitting clear authority to test could fail the statute’s element and the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Brown warned that reading “test” out of the statute would undermine the particularity that warrants require.
The state, represented by Natalie Edmondson, countered that the defendant’s admitted deliberate choice not to stop and the video and officer testimony supplied a rational basis to deny the lesser instruction and that the facts supported a finding of evasion. On the warrant issue the state argued the statutory language is used throughout the code as an integrated process and that, in practice, a warrant that authorizes seizure of blood for DUI-related evidence will be understood to permit testing.
Judges probed hypotheticals (for example, whether driving deliberately to a well-lit public place to await backup would count as evading) and examined dashcam testimony and officer reports about rolling stops, a stop-sign instance alleged in one portion of the testimony, and driving onto a dirt road at the outskirts of town. Counsel debated whether those facts made this case distinguishable from scenarios where an officer’s pursuit was continuous and the defendant speeded away.
Appellant also urged that the motion to arrest judgment preserved a sufficiency and statutory-interpretation challenge, relying on Rule 23 and case law that allows post-trial arrest-judgment motions to test whether the facts admitted at trial constitute the charged offense.
The court thanked counsel, took the matters under advisement, and said a written opinion would follow.
