State Supreme Court hears challenge over refund and vacatur for drug‑court participant after Blake decision

The Washington State Supreme Court on Feb. 24 heard arguments in State of Washington v. Karen Kathleen Peterson over whether a person who entered drug‑court diversion and later had the underlying statute declared unconstitutional can use Criminal Rule 7.8 to vacate a charge and secure reimbursement of fees.

Willa Osborne, representing Peterson for the Washington Appellate Project, told the court that Peterson ‘‘paid $900 and entered drug treatment court’’ and, after more than a year in the program, ‘‘earned the dismissal of that charge.’’ Osborne said the court's decision in Blake, which found the statute unconstitutional, entitles people like Peterson to relief and that a trial‑court order of vacatur is the practical mechanism to trigger refunds administered under the state's Blake refund process.

Osborne asked the justices to treat the drug‑court outcome as a proceeding from which relief should flow under CR 7.8, arguing in part that the Blake refund mechanism and administrative practice require an order of vacatur to effectuate reimbursement. ‘‘The real value of an order of vacatur in this case is to effectuate the refund,’’ she said, adding that due‑process principles and the criminal rule support relief even for non‑convicted individuals who were prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute.

Deputy Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney Amanda Campbell urged the court to reject an expansive reading of CR 7.8. ‘‘Ms. Peterson asked for the court to greatly expand the possible claims a defendant may bring under Criminal Rule 7.8,’’ Campbell said, arguing that the rule and the Blake appropriations statutes contain limits that were intended to focus refunds on persons with convictions. She told the justices that deferred prosecutions and diversion programs, while sometimes treated like convictions for certain future sentencing purposes, are not convictions and that the statutory refund pot created by the legislature expressly targets persons with convictions.

The justices pressed both sides on several recurring issues: whether the vacatur statutes and CR 7.8 use language that limits relief to ‘‘judgments’’ and ‘‘sentences,’’ whether a vacatur of a charge (as opposed to vacatur of a conviction) is authorized, and whether vacating a charge would have collateral consequences in areas like immigration and professional licensing. One justice asked whether, if vacatur were unavailable, constitutional due‑process principles would still demand reimbursement of fees; counsel differed on that point.

Justices also questioned the purpose of the $900 fee in Snohomish County drug court. Osborne said the fee ‘‘goes to the administration of the court,’’ is mandatory regardless of whether a participant completes the program, and ‘‘does not go to treatment’’ providers. Campbell countered that participants receive benefits under the drug‑court contract—supervision and social services—and argued that contract concepts, and not CR 7.8, may be the appropriate vehicle for some refund claims.

The court discussed procedural timing and exceptions in CR 7.8; defense counsel pointed to the court's Blake and Nelson v. Colorado reasoning and argued that petitioners can make a ‘‘substantial showing’’ entitling them to trial‑court consideration under the rule. The state emphasized statutory timeliness language and noted that several 7.8 subsections explicitly reference judgments, which the state says should limit the rule's use for non‑convicted participants.

Counsel on both sides referenced case law cited in the parties' briefs (including this court's Blake decision and federal precedent such as Nelson v. Colorado) and lower‑court decisions addressing related issues; the justices asked the parties to distinguish those authorities and consider whether GR 9's 2021 amendments—adopted to facilitate Blake refunds—change the availability of trial‑court relief to non‑convicted persons.

Campbell told the court that if 7.8(b) is not an available vehicle, petitioners like Peterson might instead pursue civil contract or unjust‑enrichment claims in superior court, though she suggested those avenues would be difficult and criticized attempts to ‘‘work backwards’’ from legislative refund provisions to expand a judicial rule.

After extensive questioning from multiple justices on statutory text, timing, and policy consequences, the Chief Justice thanked counsel and submitted the case. The court recessed to consider the arguments.

What happens next: The Supreme Court will conference and issue an opinion resolving whether CR 7.8 permits the relief Peterson seeks and, if so, the scope of remedies (vacatur of a charge, reimbursement limited to state‑exacted funds, or other relief).