Estate asks court to accept discretionary review after defendant dies post-verdict
Loading...
Summary
On April 1, 2026, counsel for the estate of Richard Spoelstra asked the Other Court to take discretionary review after Spoelstra died two days after a verdict and before sentencing, arguing the family suffered reputational and financial harms and raising Brady/prosecutorial-misconduct claims; the state opposed and the court took the motion under advisement.
On April 1, 2026, during a remote motion docket, Edward Reving, counsel for the estate of Richard Spoelstra, asked the Other Court to accept a petition for discretionary review after Spoelstra died two days following a jury verdict and before sentencing or entry of final judgment.
"Your honor, this court should accept discretionary review because the superior court's ruling created a permanent, verdict without, judgment posture," Reving told the court. He said Spoelstra "died 2 days after the verdict, before sentencing and before entry of any final judgment," leaving no ordinary appellate avenue.
Reving argued the case raised potentially serious merit issues that deserved appellate consideration and said the procedural posture would otherwise create a class of criminal cases insulated from meaningful appellate oversight. He told the court there were alleged Brady violations and "prosecutorial misconduct matters that were raised," and he described reputational and financial harms to Spoelstra's family: Spoelstra had worked for the Department of Defense, had no prior criminal history, was removed from his property during the case, and his wife later had to move from that residence.
"What would be the remedy for a reputation?" the presiding judge asked, pressing how the estate was "aggrieved" under the appellate rules. Reving replied that reputational harm did not end with Spoelstra's death and that the family continued to suffer financial and reputational burdens that, he said, a merits review could help address.
Bridal Sutton, for the state, told the court she did not have "a lot to add to what I've said in my briefing" but argued the estate had not met the Webb/Devon standards for discretionary review. Sutton said the substitution procedures discussed in Webb and Devon apply where an appeal of right or substitution occurs post-verdict and post-sentencing, and that the estate had opportunities to pursue substitution in the superior court and to petition for review under established standards.
"I think they did substitute in the superior court, and I don't think the state objected to that," Sutton said, summarizing her view of the record; she urged the court to require the estate to show it meets the discretionary-review standards before granting review.
The judge acknowledged the competing positions and noted the estate emphasized the "unique" antecedent posture — death before any judgment or sentencing had been entered — which, Reving said, differentiates this matter from Webb and Devon. After questioning counsel, the court said it would take the motion under advisement and issue a written ruling as quickly as possible. The court also confirmed there were no technical problems during the remote argument and adjourned the motion docket.
The court did not rule at the hearing; the motion for discretionary review remains under advisement pending a written decision.
Sources: Oral argument on the Other Court motion docket, April 1, 2026.
