Court of Criminal Appeals hears challenge to dismissal after defendant briefly left courtroom
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Summary
At an oral argument at the University of Memphis Law School, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals heard counsel for Laura Clifton say a trial court improperly dismissed her post-conviction petition with prejudice after she briefly left the courtroom; the State urged the appeal be dismissed as untimely. The judges pressed both sides on whether the record contains sufficient findings to support dismissal and on waiver of the filing deadline.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals convened at the University of Memphis Law School to hear oral argument in Laura Clifton’s appeal, which centers on whether a trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of her post-conviction petition after she briefly left the courtroom was an abuse of process and whether the appeal was filed timely.
William Gill, counsel for Clifton, told the three-judge panel that Clifton entered a plea in May 2024 to two counts and received a two-year sentence, and that the plea agreement and plea submission hearing included an assurance — relied upon by Clifton — that she would not be placed on the offender registry. "She was willing to serve time to avoid being on the registry," Gill said, arguing that the state later placed her on the registry contrary to that assurance and that the state subsequently conceded the underlying constitutional claim below.
Gill described the critical sequence at the post-conviction hearing: Clifton, he said, became emotional, left the courtroom for less than an hour and attempted to return later, and the trial judge announced an intent to dismiss for failure to prosecute and signed a court-prepared dismissal order three days later. Gill argued the record lacks the specific findings of bad faith or abuse of process that justify the drastic sanction of dismissal with prejudice and urged the Court to reverse and remand so Clifton's meritorious constitutional claim can be decided on the merits.
Kirby May, representing the State and the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office, countered that the Court should first focus on timeliness under Tennessee Rule 4. May told the panel that the order was entered on July 10 and the notice of appeal was not filed until Sept. 30, 2025, which he characterized as 81 days after the order and untimely. "The notice of appeal was not filed until 09/30/2025. That's 81 days after the order," May said, urging the Court to dismiss the appeal as untimely or, alternatively, to affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal.
The judges pressed both sides on related issues. One member of the panel noted that the state below conceded constitutional error and asked why that did not counsel in favor of waiving strict compliance with the filing deadline in the interest of justice. May acknowledged the concession was a factor but said the Court must weigh other elements including the length of delay and the record circumstances, and he defended the trial court’s findings that the petitioner left the courtroom and abandoned the petition.
Gill used rebuttal to argue that lesser sanctions or clearer warning could have addressed the conduct and that dismissal with prejudice was disproportionate without findings of abuse of process or bad faith. He asked the Court to reverse and remand rather than remand solely for further findings.
The panel heard extensive questioning from the judges about what constitutes fair warning, the adequacy of the trial court’s factual findings, and how Tennessee precedent (including cited decisions the parties discussed) applies. The court did not issue a ruling at the hearing; the panel indicated it would review the record thoroughly before drafting any opinion.
The Court took the case under advisement; no immediate decision was announced at the close of argument.

