Massachusetts high court hears whether post-conviction testing statute covers cell-phone forensics
Loading...
Summary
In oral argument in Commonwealth v. Watson, attorneys disputed whether chapter 278Aa post-conviction forensic-testing statuteapplies only to biologically testable evidence like DNA or also to historical cell-phone data that defense counsel says could show witness perjury.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on the hearing record considered whether chapter 278A permits post-conviction forensic analysis of historic cell phones and device-level data in a homicide case. Attorney Darcy Jordan, for the Commonwealth, told the court that chapter 278A is "a narrow exception to a long standing principle of rule 30" and applies only to evidence "capable of biological testing" that can yield a direct connection to the perpetrator.
Merit Schnipper, counsel for the defendant, Javaine Watson, urged a broader reading. Schnipper argued the seized phones show extensive communications among relevant actors and that new forensic tools developed since trial can extract location timelines and other device data that may demonstrate a key witness's testimony was false. "If you get that phone and you figure out who knows those 10 people ... you've got me," Schnipper told the court, comparing a phone's social-network footprint to DNA as a uniquely identifying pattern.
Why the issue matters: Chapter 278A was enacted to let convicted persons obtain forensic analysis of evidence when modern techniques can produce more reliable results than were available at trial. The parties disputed whether the statute's text, which refers to "evidence or biological material," should be read narrowly to encompass only DNA-type testing or broadly enough to include physical items and device extractions. The bench repeatedly pressed both sides on the statute's disjunctive language and on the policy consequences of a broad reading.
Key points from argument - Commonwealth: Jordan argued the statute contains internal limiting language and a legislative intent focused on biological material ("blood, saliva, hair") and that treating 278A as a general discovery tool would "swallow Rule 30." She said digital evidence used only to impeach or attack credibility does not meet the statute's materiality standard. - Defense: Schnipper countered that several phones in evidence show substantial communications among the defendant, co-defendants and the prosecution's witness, and that modern device extraction can reveal location and timeline information not obtainable from SIM or call-log records at trial. He described specific counts (e.g., hundreds of contacts between certain phones) presented at the lower-court hearing to support materiality to identity and alleged witness perjury. - Technology and timing: Justices pressed whether the fact that modern tools can now access device-level data (password removal/forensic extraction) changes the analysis when the evidence existed but was inaccessible at trial. The defense relied on the superior court's factual findings that certain devices were not extractable at trial and that new techniques are now available. - Procedural posture: Counsel debated the statute's relationship to Rule 30 (the standard for newly discovered evidence and motions for new trial). The Commonwealth said the request repackages a credibility claim that belongs in Rule 30; the defense said 278A was enacted precisely to provide access for investigations that Rule 30 procedures effectively foreclosed.
Quotes from the hearing - "Chapter 278A is a narrow exception to a long standing principle of rule 30," Darcy Jordan said to the court. - "If you get that phone and you figure out who knows those 10 people and those types of relationships, you've got me," Merit Schnipper said, arguing that phone data can function as an identifying "blueprint" similar in force to DNA.
Authorities cited on the record - Chapter 278A (post-conviction forensic testing statute) - Rule 30 (new-trial / newly discovered evidence standard)
What the court asked: Justices repeatedly probed how to read the statute's disjunctive phrasing ("evidence or biological material"), whether past 278A decisions involving ballistics or other physical evidence affect the analysis, and how to weigh advances in forensic technology against the statute's remedial purpose.
Outcome and next steps: Argument concluded with counsel asking the court to affirm or reverse the superior court's order; the bench did not announce a decision at the hearing. The court will issue a written opinion.
Background and context: The underlying case involves a homicide conviction in which a key witness's testimony was central to the Commonwealth's theory. The defense seeks post-conviction access to several historic cell phones and device-level data to test whether communications and location records undermine that witness's credibility or identify other participants. The parties and the trial judge also litigated related factual findings about whether trial counsel sought access and whether technological advances now make device extraction possible.
The hearing record includes detailed factual findings and contested counts of communications among phones presented to the superior court; the high court's decision will shape how chapter 278A is applied to modern digital evidence and whether device-forensic requests that go beyond biological testing are permissible under the statute.
