SJC considers whether Boston can redevelop White Stadium on protected Franklin Parkland

The Supreme Judicial Court on Tuesday heard competing legal views over whether statutes enacted in 1947 and 1950 and the terms of the George Robert White Fund Trust permit the City of Boston to rebuild and lease White Stadium in Franklin Park to a private soccer team.

Counsel for the plaintiffs opened by telling the court, "This case concerns the disposition and change in use of land within Franklin Park," tracing the parcel's origin to an 1883 eminent-domain taking explicitly for park purposes and citing the Parks Act of 1875 and Frederick Law Olmsted's involvement in the park's early design. Plaintiffs argue the later statutes and funding measures do not explicitly surrender the original park dedication and therefore Article 97 and related statutes continue to protect the land.

A justice read language from the 1950 act — "so long as White Stadium shall remain in the custody and control of the school committee of Boston ... shall be deemed to be a school building and yard" — and used that text to probe whether subsequent statutes can be read together to change the parcel's dedicated park purpose. Plaintiffs' counsel urged the court to follow precedent such as Higginson v. Slattery, which requires clear legislative authorization to repurpose parkland.

Samuel Abolce, counsel for the City of Boston and the trustees of the George Robert White Fund, countered that the 1947 and 1950 statutes, read together and in context, "identify the land" and set the parcel's use going forward. Abolce argued the 1950 act both recognizes the existing stadium and provides authority for funding, replacement and improvements so long as the facility remains under Boston Public Schools' custody, and said the city's lease and stadium-usage agreement preserve schools' primary role while allowing limited team use.

Much of the hearing focused on two related legal questions: (1) whether the mid-century statutes can be combined or should be read in isolation under Higginson and related case law, and (2) whether Article 97's two-thirds legislative-approval requirement applies retroactively to a nineteenth-century taking. A justice pressed whether a retroactive two-thirds standard would require additional historical legislative action; counsel acknowledged the issue is unsettled in this court's precedents.

Justices also questioned whether elements of the proposed development — notably an approximately 8,000–8,100 square-foot retail/food-service space and interior grandstand areas that would be exclusive to the team on certain days — amount to an unauthorized private use of parkland or are permissible accessory or leased uses of school property. Plaintiffs' counsel warned that the plan's private components "are completely at odds with the position taken by the trust," and urged that structures of that size placed on land taken for park purposes typically require explicit legislative approval.

A separate line of dispute concerned access and vehicular pathways across Franklin Park: plaintiffs' counsel characterized project documents as granting enforceable rights (an easement) over park paths and said construction of new roadways and service trenches on park-protected land would be a disposition under the Public Lands Protection Act. City counsel responded that the project's plans largely reuse existing paths, that any changes are traffic-management measures (shuttle service, off-site parking, MBTA access), and described the contested driveways and loading configurations as limited in scope.

The bench repeatedly returned to record and findings issues. Several justices asked whether the trial court made specific findings about whether new roadways will be built or whether shared or exclusive control over the stadium has shifted; one justice said the absence of explicit findings could counsel in favor of a remand for fact-finding. Counsel for both sides pointed the court to exhibits and the lease and usage agreements in the trial record.

The hearing touched on trust-law concerns as well: plaintiffs' counsel said the George Robert White Fund Trust generally forbids charging the public more than maintenance costs and argued that the city and trustees should have sought instructions from the probate court; the trial judge excluded some probate-related evidence, which plaintiffs noted in argument.

The court did not announce a decision at the hearing's close. The justices focused their questions on statutory text, precedent about combining statutes, Article 97's retroactive application, the record's factual findings about roads and traffic, and whether specific lease terms yield retained custody and control by Boston Public Schools. If the court deems the statutes insufficiently explicit or finds unresolved factual issues about new roadways or exclusive private use, it suggested it may order further findings or other relief rather than summarily affirming the lower-court judgment.

The argument is part of Emerald Inc. et al. v. City of Boston et al.; the court's next steps and timing for any opinion were not announced at the hearing.