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Court of Appeals hears arguments in Booth v. Tavakoli over statute‑of‑limitations for emotional‑distress claim
Summary
A three‑judge Division Two panel heard oral argument over whether alleged domestic violence should be treated as a single, continuous course of conduct for the statute of limitations on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; attorneys disputed whether earlier alleged assaults are time‑barred or subsumed within IIED damages.
Acting Chief Judge Eric Price and a three‑judge panel heard argument May 1 in Booth v. Tavakoli on whether earlier acts of alleged domestic violence should be treated as a continuous course of conduct for purposes of the statute of limitations on an intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim.
Appellant counsel Jeff Keddy, representing Soraya Booth, told the court that the superior court erroneously granted partial summary judgment by treating discrete acts as separate for limitations purposes. "Domestic violence is about power and control in a relationship where the person causing harm seeks to dominate their partner and maintain authority through a range of behaviors and tactics," Keddy said, arguing that the allegations — which he said span from about April 2019 through the last reported incident on June 1, 2020 — should be considered together for damages calculation.
Respondent counsel Roger Bennett, representing Dr. Tavakoli, acknowledged the seriousness of the allegations but urged the panel to resolve a narrower legal question about time bars. "You can't disguise your cause of action," Bennett told the court, arguing that earlier alleged assaults would have been governed by a shorter limitations period (he cited case law including Rice v. Janovich) and that relabeling those acts as IIED cannot be used to evade the statute of limitations.
The bench questioned both sides about practical consequences and legal doctrines. Judges pressed whether the court should adopt a case‑specific holding or a categorical rule, asked about the role of equitable tolling for domestic violence victims, and explored the difference between the existence of a claim and the damages that a successful claim may recover. Responding to a question about special rules for domestic‑violence victims, Bennett said equitable tolling could apply in principle but argued it did not on the facts here because the plaintiff left the relationship, secured counsel, and had an opportunity to file within the limitations period.
Appellant emphasized that additional conduct after June 1 — including alleged violations of a no‑contact order and third‑party contacts — supported an IIED claim that is not simply duplicative of assault or battery damages. Counsel pointed to RCW 4.16.080 as the governing Washington statute on limitations and cited Washington and out‑of‑state authorities on continuous‑course and discovery doctrines.
The panel took the matter under advisement. The court indicated it would take the remainder of its calendar without oral argument and adjourned; no decision was announced at the hearing.