Get Full Government Meeting Transcripts, Videos, & Alerts Forever!
Get email alerts on the Money Laundering Forfeiture topic
No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.
Appeals court hears challenge to scope of money‑laundering forfeiture in Commonwealth's seizure case
Summary
In oral argument, appellants told a three‑judge panel the Commonwealth failed to show that assets beyond $106,000 were ‘obtained directly’ through money‑laundering and thus were not forfeitable; the panel questioned whether Massachusetts law requires a more direct tracing than federal precedents allow.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court heard arguments on Nov. 17 in Commonwealth v. $85,200 and other assets (2025P160), a dispute over how far the state's money‑laundering forfeiture law reaches.
Attorney Matt Thompson, representing interveners Robert and Andrea Patrino, told the panel the petition below alleged only $106,000 in stolen jewelry and that “the Commonwealth did not meet its burden” to show any additional funds were “obtained directly as a result of a money‑laundering transaction.” He urged the court to read the statutory phrase to require a direct tracing nexus rather than allowing broad substitution of defendants’ assets based on criminal history or generalized suspicion.
Assistant District Attorney Matthew Palano responded that the Commonwealth’s initial burden in civil forfeiture is relatively low and often must rely on circumstantial evidence. “This case boils down to what the Commonwealth’s burden is in a money‑laundering forfeiture case,” Palano said, arguing the agency may rely on circumstantial indications and the lack of an innocent explanation to meet probable cause in the civil context.
Panel questions focused on textual differences between Massachusetts’ money‑laundering forfeiture provision (cited at argument as G.L. c. 267A §2) and the drug‑forfeiture statute (cited as G.L. c. 94C §47), and on whether federal cases that permit a looser tracing analysis should control. The judges pressed counsel on whether the Commonwealth below proceeded under subparagraph 2 (transactional theories) or subparagraph 3 (organizational or facilitation theories) of c. 267A §2, and whether the trial judge's summary‑judgment ruling turned on the wrong legal standard.
Thompson urged that a narrow reading prevents law enforcement from “going after every person ever convicted of a criminal offense and tak[ing] everything they have,” while Palano said the lower civil standard and evidence of a defendant’s career in theft can, together with lack of other explanations, provide probable cause. The panel repeatedly returned to where the statutory text departs from broader federal formulations and asked whether a remand for further factual development would be necessary if the court adopts a tracing nexus requirement.
The court did not rule at argument. The panel signaled interest in a written disposition because the issue implicates the statutory language, precedents from the Supreme Judicial Court, and the scope of civil forfeiture in Massachusetts.
Next step: a written opinion is expected; the court may either publish a precedential ruling narrowing or affirming the trial court’s approach or remand for additional factfinding.
