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Army Corps: Daytona Beach flooding driven by low slope, not tides; most federal options fail economic test
Summary
U.S. Army Corps engineers told the Daytona Beach City Commission their hydraulics and economic models show the city likely fails Corps criteria (an 800 CFS conveyance rule and benefit‑cost thresholds); buyouts (about 40 structures in the modeled buyout area) produced the best cost‑benefit results but still hover below full federal justification.
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The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on May 6 presented a multi‑year flood risk study for Daytona Beach and warned that the city’s interior flooding is driven mainly by low topographic slope rather than tidal influence — a finding that sharply limits the chances of a large federally funded Corps project. "You're unfortunately, the topography that we're dealing with here is extremely low lying," said Jason Lavecchia, the Corps’ engineering technical lead, describing a HEC‑RAS hydraulics model calibrated to local flood events.
Corps staff said two technical limits are especially difficult for Daytona Beach to meet. First, many alternatives have low benefit‑to‑cost ratios (BCRs) once the team overlays flooding outputs with an economic damage model. Corps economists said the most promising buyout analysis produced a BCR near 0.8 — below the 1.0 threshold the Corps and many federal funders use to prioritize projects. "Many of them look very poor to the point where we are not going to be running a full economic analysis because the costs are going to outstrip the benefit," an Army Corps economist said.
Second, Corps policy requires roughly 800 cubic feet per second (CFS) conveyance in a channel for certain 10‑year event tests. Lavecchia told commissioners the modeled Nova Canal conveys roughly 350–400 CFS on a 10‑year event, well under the 800‑CFS rule. "If you don't have 800 CFS, you don't have a federal project," he said, summarizing a longstanding Corps policy.
The Corps briefed options that remain technically and politically complex: limited buyouts concentrated where first‑floor elevations are most vulnerable, sluice gates and pump stations at canal outfalls, and large retention/centralized storage such as repurposing part of a golf course as a retention basin. The buyout alternative would remove the most‑frequently flooded houses and generated the highest BCR in the Corps’ screening; staff estimated roughly 40 structures would be candidates under the 25‑year buyout scenario but cautioned the number is approximate.
"Buyouts is the one that appears to be the most effective solution from a cost put in, benefit taken out," Tom Jester of the Corps said, while noting the social cost of removing residents and community cohesion.
City and county staff emphasized parallel, locally funded work that could yield near‑term benefits. Shannon Ponce, Daytona Beach utilities director, described a county‑funded Transform 386 citywide stormwater master plan that is modeling basins and looking for smaller, cost‑effective projects to reduce nuisance flooding: "You might be able to improve things for smaller events, but when you have the catastrophic floods, the hurricanes that we've seen, these improvements aren't going to help that," she said. Volusia County Public Works director Ben Bartlett added that regional coordination is central to any viable project because several canals and outfalls cross multiple jurisdictions.
What happens next: Corps staff said they will finish additional alternatives modeling and turn over documented hydraulic and economic models and assumptions to the city (staff said the Corps expects to hand over models and technical reports by the end of the year). Commissioners pressed staff about near‑term steps — the Corps recommended finishing the modeling and using the outputs to pursue targeted projects and regional funding partners, noting that a fully effective citywide fix could cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars and would be unlikely to receive full federal construction funding under current rules.
The presentation left commissioners and the public with a clear, if unwelcome, conclusion: while the city now has detailed hydraulic and economic models to guide decision making, federal policy and economics make a full Corps‑funded solution unlikely; local, regional, and targeted buyout and infrastructure adaptations remain the primary pathways forward.

