Commonwealth tells Virginia high court purchase of endangered species should be a crime

At oral argument in Commonwealth v. Antle, Aaron Campbell, counsel for the Commonwealth, asked the Virginia Supreme Court to reverse the court of appeals and hold that purchasing endangered species is a crime under state law. "We're asking that the court reverse the court of appeals and find that purchasing endangered species is a crime in Virginia," Campbell told the justices, urging them to harmonize statutes so the word "purchasing" is meaningful.

Campbell told the court he sought three remedies: harmonize any conflict among the contested statutes; make the purchasing language in the cited provision meaningful; and avoid an interpretation that would defeat the General Assembly's intent to prohibit and punish purchases of endangered species. He pointed to a 1994 amendment and a single punishment provision (identified in the transcript as 29.1553) that, he said, brings buying and selling under the same penalty scheme.

Several justices pressed Campbell on statutory text and criminal-law principles. One asked what the court should do when legislative intent and the text "demonstrably do not match up," and another noted the purchasing language appears in the remedy or punishment provision rather than the elements section. A justice raised a fact-based hypothetical: a parent who unknowingly buys a protected puppy or kitten, arguing that buyers may lack the sophistication of sellers and that the legislature might have intended to target sellers rather than unaware purchasers.

The court also questioned how indictments had been framed. Campbell said the indictment in the case charged provisions the transcript cites as "5 64" and "5 67," and he described those sections as supplying the elements while the punishment appears in the broader title-29 series. Justices asked whether it is appropriate to rely on a punishment provision to supply elements of a crime.

The justices discussed the rule of lenity, with some suggesting that any ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of defendants. Campbell acknowledged the rule but argued lenity does not apply where harmonization and the statutory scheme indicate the General Assembly intended to punish purchases of endangered species.

A justice who spoke later expressed a contrasting view, urging fidelity to the statutory text and caution about creating new substantive offenses through judicial construction. "I don't agree exactly with my colleague on the court's task of ultimately giving effect to the legislative," that justice said, stressing that the court should give effect to the words the legislature enacted and be cautious about creating new crimes.

Campbell reserved rebuttal time and, after the court momentarily announced adjournment, was given one minute and 45 seconds to reply. In rebuttal he reiterated that the best evidence of legislative intent is the statute's words and urged the court to harmonize the provisions rather than treat the purchasing language as superfluous.

The argument closed after further brief exchanges about whether courts should "iron out" legislative mistakes. The court adjourned without issuing a decision; no vote or ruling was recorded at the hearing.