Justices hear arguments over whether objects in defined‑width easements can be enjoined in Thibault v. Yost

The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Thibault Enterprises LLC v. Yost on whether a landowner may place objects inside a defined‑width easement without creating a right to injunctive relief for the easement holder.

Phil ip Strother, appellant’s counsel for Thibault Enterprises, told the court that the lower courts’ injunction “imposed sweeping and unprecedented restrictions on the rights of a servient estate owner” and urged reversal, saying the ruling “would upend nearly a century of Virginia property law.” Strother emphasized that the deed here grants “the right of way for egress and ingress over an Outlet Road, 50 feet in width, for the exclusive purpose to have access to a single family dwelling unit,” and he portrayed the current roadway as a 12‑foot gravel lane rather than a full 50‑foot surface.

Bruce Arkema, representing the Yost trust, countered that the Commonwealth’s precedents for defined‑width easements have consistently held that placing objects in the defined width that narrow the easement is unreasonable and impermissible. Arkema said such objects risk allowing prescriptive narrowing over time, noting that “if somebody puts objects in that easement over the statutory period of 20 years, placing objects there” can amount to adverse possession that permanently reduces the easement the dominant estate was granted.

A central legal question at argument was whether Va. Code §55.1305 (referred to during argument) requires a case‑by‑case assessment of whether a particular object unreasonably interferes with ingress and egress, or whether a bright‑line rule should apply to defined‑width easements. One justice pressed whether, under Strother’s view, an easement that simply grants “ingress and egress” with no measurement would permit any size vehicle and thus render measurement irrelevant; Strother replied the analysis depends on the deed’s text and the rights conveyed. Other justices tested hypotheticals—hay bales, grapevines, mature trees, tractors, logging equipment and even relocation of rocks or graves—to probe when an object becomes an actionable interference and whether equitable relief should issue before an interference actually occurs.

Justices also asked about the practical consequences of either rule. Counsel debated whether equity should issue an injunction against speculative future uses and whether owners must repeatedly sue to preserve a full defined width if neighboring uses shift. Arkema pointed to statutory language and prior case law (including references in argument to cases the bench called Pisarelli, Snead, Piney Meeting House and Tidwell) to support a rule that objects within a defined width are presumptively problematic because allowing them creates the risk of permanent narrowing by prescription.

The arguments centered on three practical points: (1) how to read the specific deed language conveying the easement, (2) whether the statutory standard in §55.1305 (as cited in argument) restores reasonableness into the analysis or is consistent with prior bright‑line holdings, and (3) what remedies equity may provide when an alleged encroachment is not currently blocking ingress or egress but could over time create prescriptive loss of rights.

No ruling was announced from the bench during the argument. The court heard oral argument from both sides and took the matter under advisement.