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Counsel at high court split over whether trial courts get deference when relying on depositions
Summary
In Stevens and others v. Jernigan, counsel for the defendants urged the Supreme Court to give trial judges appellate deference for factual findings based on agreed, admitted depositions; appellee’s counsel urged the court to apply de novo review, likening deposition-based pleas in bar to summary judgment.
The Supreme Court heard competing arguments Tuesday over whether trial-court factual findings based on admitted depositions should receive appellate deference. Brynn Clegg, counsel for the SBC defendants, told the court the parties expressly submitted the matter as a factual dispute for the judge to decide and that the judge relied on deposition testimony and exhibits that were admitted without objection.
"My clients were entitled to appellate deference," Clegg told the justices, arguing that a trial judge who serves as the factfinder and who considers agreed deposition evidence performs the same function as when hearing live testimony. She added that Virginia practice and precedent support deference to such credibility determinations: "There should be no difference or distinction made between live testimony in front of the court and deposition testimony that has been properly admitted."
Clegg emphasized practical reasons for deference, including judicial economy and the parties' strategic decision to rely on depositions and exhibits instead of calling live witnesses. She pointed to prior decisions cited in briefing and to cases such as Mead v. Commonwealth as examples the court has considered when addressing similar questions.
Daniel Vincent, counsel for appellee Steve Thomas Jernigan, pressed the opposite view and asked the court to affirm the Court of Appeals. Vincent said the trial court "short circuited the litigation" by resolving contested factual issues prematurely and argued that when a statute-of-limitations defense is presented via a plea in bar based on deposition material, the correct appellate standard is de novo review similar to summary judgment.
"The point of my presentation today ... is that when it is submitted just on a deposition and the court does not hear oral testimony, it should be treated as a motion for summary judgment," Vincent said, urging the court to review whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
Justices pressed both sides on practical and doctrinal boundaries: whether a videotaped deposition that a judge watched differs from reading a transcript, how prior case law such as Barney and Gay v. Norfolk & Western Railroad Co. should be applied, and whether labeling (plea in bar) or substance (admitted evidence and what the trial court actually considered) should control the standard of review. Counsel acknowledged the record does not clearly show whether the trial judge viewed the video deposition, and the court asked whether the presence of exhibits, multiple depositions, and stipulations affected the appellate analysis.
Neither side reported a decision from the bench. Counsel used allotted rebuttal and closing time to distinguish precedent and reiterate their positions: Clegg asked the court to reverse the Court of Appeals and afford the trial judge deference; Vincent asked the court to affirm and apply de novo review. The court reserved its ruling.
The case centers on how appellate courts should treat dispositive rulings when the trial court relied on deposition testimony and related exhibits that the parties agreed to submit as the evidentiary record.
