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Supreme Court hears dispute over whether police can seize marked "buy" money without specific forfeiture pleading
Summary
At oral argument in Morris v. Commonwealth, appellant's counsel argued the Commonwealth failed to identify the full amount of seized "buy" money in its civil forfeiture pleading and therefore violated statutory pleading and timing rules; the Commonwealth urged dismissal for procedural defect or, alternatively, defended the trial court's holding that marked buy money remained government property.
Caleb Routhier, counsel for appellant Michelle Morris, told the court, "This case is about whether police can simply seize forfeitable money," arguing that the Commonwealth failed to satisfy statutory pleading requirements when it did not identify precisely what cash it sought to forfeit.
Routhier said the petition in the civil forfeiture action did not differentiate "buy money" from other seized cash and pointed to record entries indicating roughly $12,000 in buy money while officers seized about $15,000. He urged the court to enforce what he described as the statute's strict-compliance rule and to reverse the lower courts’ rulings so that law enforcement follows the statutory procedures, even if that sometimes reduces funds available for immediate investigative use.
A justice interrupted to press procedural posture questions. The bench asked whether a final order existed in the civil forfeiture file and whether the appellant's amended assignment of error preserved the forfeiture issue for this court. Routhier relied on prior authority (transcribed in argument as Jenkins v. Commonwealth) and said the records contained a civil forfeiture order alongside criminal proceedings.
Matt Byer, for the Commonwealth, opened by arguing the appeal should be dismissed because the assignment of error is insufficient under the court's rule; he added that, if the court reaches the merits, it should affirm. Byer told the court that one permissible reading of the record is that the trial court concluded the marked money remained the property of the state police, a rationale the Commonwealth asked the high court to adopt narrowly.
During extended bench questioning, justices probed legal limits on ownership of marked buy money, asking whether recognizing a defendant's title in such funds would eviscerate forfeiture statutes in many drug cases. The bench and counsel discussed possible limiting principles — for example, whether marked, photographed or otherwise traceable money used in a supervised, controlled buy should remain government property — and the practical consequences of enforcing the statute's 90‑day filing requirement.
Counsel and the court also discussed distribution of forfeited funds as described during argument (the transcript records a discussion that 90 percent would return to state police and 10 percent would be kept for administrative fees) and whether that allocation creates incentives that affect compliance with pleading rules.
Routhier concluded by urging the court to reverse to preserve the statutory protections and to give guidance to lower courts and practitioners about what the pleadings must contain. The parties submitted argument and the case was taken under advisement; no immediate decision was announced from the bench.
