Justices weigh whether non‑mandatory reporters get immunity for police reports in Cupp v. Delta

The Virginia Supreme Court heard argument in Cupp v. Delta Airlines over whether a non‑mandatory reporter who notified law enforcement — rather than the local Department of Social Services (DSS) or the DSS toll‑free hotline — is entitled to civil‑liability immunity under the state's child‑abuse reporting statutes, counsel said at oral argument.

Appellant's counsel Corey Ford told the court that the statute creating immunity must be read with the text Congress and the General Assembly wrote and that immunity under the act requires reporting to DSS or the hotline. "Under section 15 12, which is the immunity granting statute, it incorporates 2 statutes. 1 is 15 0 9, 1 is 15 10," Ford said, arguing that 15.10 defines a complaint as one made to the local department (DSS) or the department's toll‑free hotline and that law‑enforcement reports are not included. Ford said the statutory screening by DSS — including provisions that require DSS to screen for valid complaints and purge invalid ones — is a chief reason the legislature limited immunity to reports made to DSS.

Ford also described the factual consequences in this case: "They pulled the family off the plane. They separated Mr. Cupp. They separated his daughter, and they interrogated them in view of the public causing a severe relapse of his PTSD," he said, asking the court to apply the statute's text to those facts.

Defense counsel Catherine Grace, joined in the courtroom by Nicole Milvani, countered that the statutory scheme is designed to encourage public reporting and that the practical message behind the law supports protection for non‑mandatory reporters. "See something, say something. That is what this statutory scheme is all about," Grace told the justices, and she urged the court to read 15.10 in the context of related provisions (including 63.2‑15.03(d)) and precedent such as Wolf and Davidson.

The bench repeatedly probed both the textual limits of the immunity provisions and the policy implications of expanding immunity beyond the statute's listed avenues. One justice noted the statute's language specifying notification "to the local department of the county or city wherein the child resides or wherein the abuse or neglect is believed to have occurred or to the department's toll free child abuse and neglect hotline," and pressed counsel on whether a broader construction would effectively require laypeople to know and read a complicated statutory scheme.

Counsel disputed whether prior federal‑court decisions cited to the court (Wolf, Davidson) control the outcome here; both sides used those opinions to support different readings of how intermediary reports and hotline instructions affect a reporter's entitlement to civil immunity. Defense counsel acknowledged that, on the motion‑to‑dismiss record, there is no evidence the flight attendant called DSS or the hotline; she said the attendant reported to the captain and that the airline then contacted law enforcement.

Throughout argument, the court explored limiting principles: whether immunity should be conditioned on good faith and whether the statutory text expressly confines immunity to reports delivered to DSS or the hotline. Ford argued that the legislature's repeated references to DSS procedures and the administrative code provisions that require certain DSS notifications show the legislature intended DSS to remain central to the immunity scheme.

The court did not rule at argument. The justices questioned both sides at length about statutory text, administrative‑code provisions, and precedent; the case will be resolved when the court issues an opinion after considering the arguments and briefing.