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Bill to restore intent requirement in home and land improvement fraud advances after counsel walkthrough
Summary
Legislative counsel explained S183 would restore a 'knowingly' intent requirement and extend coverage to change orders, narrowing criminal exposure and addressing trial-court decisions that raised 13th Amendment concerns about criminalizing simple breaches of contract.
Legislative counsel walked the House Judiciary Committee through S183 on March 31, describing two targeted changes to the state's home and land improvement fraud statute.
Hillary Ames of Legislative Council said the bill returns the criminal statute to its pre-2015 framing by requiring that a person "knowingly enter into a contract" with intent not to perform, and by adding "change order" to the definition of qualifying contracts so contract modifications made with fraudulent intent are covered. She said the 2015 amendments had read in some cases like a criminalization of breach-of-contract and that trial-court decisions recently raised constitutional concerns under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Ames described the substantive elements: a qualifying contract for home or land improvement (written or oral) must meet a monetary threshold (at least $1,000 for single-owner contracts, $2,500 where multiple owners are involved) and the prosecution must show that the accused knowingly promised performance they did not intend to perform.
A long-term observer who testified afterward said he was present at both the 2003 enactment and the 2015 changes and supported S183's return to an intent-based standard. He cautioned that the 2015 language risked turning business failures or cash-flow problems into criminal liability for contractors who entered agreements in good faith but later could not complete work due to subsequent financial or supply problems.
Committee members asked why the bill includes two insertions of the word "knowingly." Ames said the duplication ties intent clearly to both the act of entering the contract and the promise to perform, describing the placement as a "belt-and-suspenders" drafting choice to avoid litigation over single-word ambiguities.
Members described S183 as a technical but important fix to align the state statute with constitutional precedent and the practical realities of contracting, and they thanked witnesses for their testimony.
The committee did not take a vote during the hearing and plans to consider the matter further as it finalizes statutory language.
