House Homeland Security subcommittee warns of national-security risks from Chinese AI and robotics, urges procurement limits and a national strategy

At a hearing of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity Infrastructure in February 2026, members and witnesses warned that artificial‑intelligence and robotics technologies developed by companies affiliated with the People's Republic of China pose national‑security and economic risks and called for stronger U.S. procurement limits, export controls and a national robotics strategy.

Chairman Fong said recent developments were alarming, pointing to the January 2025 release of a Chinese model called DeepSeek and alleged ‘‘distillation’’ attacks that, he said, allowed firms to extract capabilities from U.S. models. "DeepSeek did not simply outcompete American companies," he said. "According to these disclosures, it stole from them." He also warned that Unitry Robotics systems have been found vulnerable to unauthorized access and may transmit operational data to servers in China.

Witnesses offered similar warnings and policy recommendations. Dr. Maxf Finkele, global head of policy and government relations at Scale AI, told the panel that China has industrialized robotics data collection and estimated it "owns roughly 90% of the commercially available robotics AI data market today," at a cost advantage he said is 60% lower than U.S. providers. He urged Congress to treat U.S. data assets as national assets, create a single national AI regulatory framework, direct agencies to field flagship AI programs, and accelerate export of the American AI technology stack.

Mr. Matthew Malceno, vice president of software and security officer at Boston Dynamics, described robots as cyber‑physical systems with distinct risks: "A compromised robot could go around, manipulate things, look at things," he said, warning of sabotage or disruption in factories, research labs and transportation hubs. He asked the subcommittee to direct CISA to conduct security evaluations of foreign robotic systems.

Mr. Michael Robbins, president and CEO of AUVSI, said the Chinese government's industrial policy and subsidies have driven rapid adoption of PRC robotics in industry and cited an estimate of about $137 billion in PRC support for domestic robotics initiatives. He urged pairing restrictions on adversary technology with incentives for domestic production, including production tax credits and loan guarantees.

Dr. Rush Doshi of the Council on Foreign Relations summarized comparative statistics: he said Chinese factories installed about 300,000 industrial robots in 2024 versus roughly 30,000 in the United States, and recommended extending the ICTS import‑control framework to cover PRC robots, ordering CISA audits of deployed systems in critical infrastructure, and maintaining export controls on semiconductors and inference chips used in deployed robots.

On specific policy tools, witnesses uniformly agreed that Congress should consider procurement restrictions similar to earlier limits on DJI and Huawei for certain PRC robotics and AI products. When asked whether federal procurement prohibitions should be considered, multiple witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Panelists also discussed supply‑chain choke points and remedies. Witnesses cited dependencies on components such as rare‑earth magnets and advanced sensors, described the need for nearshoring and allied coordination, and urged a mix of regulatory restrictions and industrial incentives to scale domestic manufacturing.

The hearing record was held open for 10 days for additional written responses from witnesses under committee rule 7E. The subcommittee adjourned without taking formal votes on legislation at the hearing.

What happens next: witnesses were asked to submit written answers for the record; members may use the hearing record and witness recommendations as they consider legislation such as the National Robotics Commission Act (HR7334) and possible procurement or export‑control measures.