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Committee weighs H639 genetic‑data privacy; Ancestry urges narrower biometric language and warns against private lawsuits
Summary
At a hearing on H639, Ancestry representatives supported strong genetic privacy protections but pressed lawmakers to replace a broad biometric‑data definition with a focus on biological samples, sought exceptions for labs required by CLIA and opposed a private right of action, while the defender general and the state forensic lab described how courts and chain‑of‑custody practices govern criminal access to DNA.
The Senate Economic Development, Housing & General Affairs Committee heard extended testimony on H639, the proposed genetic information privacy act, from corporate witnesses, privacy officers, criminal‑defense counsel and forensic staff. Ancestry witnesses described the company’s consumer protections, raised technical drafting concerns, and urged the committee to consider enforcement design carefully to avoid unintended consequences for consumers and for innovation.
Richie Agelhard (introduced by the committee as Ancestry’s witness) and a company representative who identified themselves in the record as Michelart described Ancestry’s long partnership with Vermont (digitizing public records and providing free access to certain collections) and said the company supports strong genetic‑privacy rules. They asked the committee to strike a broad definition of biometric data and instead use the narrower concept of “biological samples” for provisions specific to direct‑to‑consumer genetic testing. “We request that the committee strike the definition of biometric data in the bill and replace all references to biometric data with biological samples,” the witness told the committee, arguing that biometric language could fold unrelated biometric‑data rules into a genetic‑testing bill and create inconsistent obligations compared with an omnibus privacy law.
Lisa, Ancestry’s chief privacy officer, told the committee the company supports codifying strong privacy practices but warned that a private right of action in the bill would invite litigators to pursue technical violations rather than focus on material privacy harms. She cited Kingsley v. Ancestry and other litigation experiences and testified that “private rights of action often prioritize litigation over actual privacy protection.” Lisa said that when private litigants can seek statutory damages, companies may geo‑restrict features or disable functionality to reduce litigation risk, which would reduce product features for Vermonters.
The committee questioned whether a cure period (a short window for businesses to remedy notice or disclosure errors before private suits proceed) would make a private right of action more acceptable. Ancestry said a cure period would be an improvement but that Attorney General enforcement is the preferred mechanism; the company also asked that deletion requirements include exceptions already found elsewhere in the bill for compliance with federal or state law (for example, the federal Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments, commonly called CLIA, which require labs to retain validation samples).
Members asked about consumer notices and opt‑in flows. Ancestry described layered transparency — a long, detailed statutory privacy notice for legal compliance and real‑time, consumer‑facing disclosures during signup and sample registration. The company said it also maintains a consumer privacy center with videos and FAQs, and that it collects metrics on who reads or interacts with those resources and could provide them to the committee.
On law‑enforcement access and criminal practice, the Defender General (who introduced himself by role) told the committee constitutional rules and court processes preserve defense and prosecution access to relevant genetic material. “Everything I I don't think you can honestly cut off avenues for us because everything that we deal with is really constitutionally based,” he said, stressing that courts resolve disputes over production and that warrants, non‑testimonial evidence orders and chain‑of‑custody requirements govern admissibility.
Trish Ki, director of the Vermont forensic laboratory, described the lab’s workflows: evidentiary samples submitted from crime scenes are processed into profiles; qualifying offender samples are uploaded to the state DNA database and searched against unknown profiles; and when a database match yields an investigative lead, agencies typically obtain a confirmation sample with a documented chain of custody before using it in court. She told the committee these processes and checks mean that consumer deletion of a privately submitted sample would not necessarily prevent courts or prosecutors from obtaining admissible DNA evidence through other means.
Legislative counsel Rick Sele acknowledged definitional and statutory‑placement concerns raised by witnesses (including a plea to avoid inconsistent definitions of biometric or genetic data across state chapters) and said the committee could refine definitions as part of drafting; he also noted that the legislature may pursue a broader, comprehensive data‑privacy structure during the session.
Members requested follow‑up materials — including data on the number of private suits in jurisdictions with private rights of action, statistics on consumer interactions with privacy notices, and technical options to reconcile biometric versus biological‑sample definitions — before further action on H639.
