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Flagstaff and APS outline multi-agency plan for public safety power shutoffs and community impacts
Summary
City staff and Arizona Public Service (APS) briefed Flagstaff City Council on Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS), mapping validation, likely four-day notices, and city department contingencies for water, wastewater, traffic signals, public safety and communications; staff said generator and fuel logistics, resilience hubs and outreach will be prioritized.
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City of Flagstaff emergency management and Arizona Public Service on March 17 presented a coordinated plan to prepare for Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, emphasizing forecasting, customer mapping validation and multi-department operational contingencies.
APS characterized PSPS as a tool of last resort used when extreme weather (high winds, very low humidity, abnormal heat) combined with hazardous fuels create unacceptable wildfire risk. APS said PSPS events are forecastable several days in advance, and the company plans to publish an interactive customer map publicly on April 1 so residents can check whether their meter is in a designated PSPS zone.
APS briefers described mitigation pillars—vegetation management, grid hardening, asset inspections, operational mitigations and PSPS as last-resort action—and said planned outages typically aim to last roughly 20 hours while crews patrol lines and re-energize safely. The company also said it is validating feeder-level risk models and meter buffers to limit impacts where possible.
City departments outlined readiness plans and constraints. Water Services Director Lee Williams said roughly 76% of the city's potable water infrastructure lies in forested, high-risk areas; the city's storage provides about 1.8 days of supply at peak usage, and generators will be deployed to key well fields and pump stations. Wastewater operations noted on-site fuel for critical plants and plans for fuel resupply via private vendors.
Public safety chiefs described contingency planning: built-in suppression systems and hydrants should remain serviceable, but battery-backed fire alarms and residential smoke detectors that switch to batteries may see increased activations. Police said dispatch and 911 continuity are assured through county systems, with mutual-aid options if staffing or operations require additional support.
Transportation and streets staff warned that about 20 of 46 traffic signals may lose power and battery backups generally last 5— hours; beyond that the city will deploy portable generators where possible, revert to stop-sign procedures at dark signals, and coordinate officers for intersections when required.
City IT, facilities and sustainability staff described backup connectivity options (Starlink at City Hall and Leaf), generator capacity at key municipal buildings, and resilience-hub planning. Staff emphasized that some resilience hubs lack permanent backup power and that funding to harden those sites remains a priority.
Communications teams from the city, Discover Flagstaff and APS described a two-track public information strategy: amplify APS customer notices (scope, duration) and provide local operational messaging on service impacts, resilience hub availability, and guidance for residents who rely on medical equipment or refrigerated medication. Staff committed to accelerating planned outreach and recommended residents sign up for RAVE/county alerts.
Council members pressed staff on accelerating the preparedness campaign, multi-family tenant notification logistics, generator and fuel logistics, contingency dry runs, and how council can help with messaging during prolonged events. Staff said they will pursue earlier campaign rollout, run operational exercises, and prioritize critical infrastructure (water, wastewater) in generator allocations.
The task force committed to an after-action report within 30 days following any PSPS event and to continuing coordination with county emergency management, Red Cross and state agencies to refine logistics, lifeline tracking and public outreach.

