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SJC hears arguments over judge's decision to allow a new trial for Stephen Pina

Judicial - Supreme Court · March 6, 2026
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Summary

At oral argument, the Commonwealth urged the Supreme Judicial Court to reverse a motion judge's allowance of a new trial for Stephen Pina, arguing legal errors about treatment records, expert admissibility, and prejudice; defense counsel defended Judge Krupp's cumulative Rule 30 finding citing third-party leads, eyewitness-ID science, psychiatric records, and DNA results.

At oral argument before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, attorneys for the Commonwealth and for Stephen Pina debated whether a motion judge properly allowed a new trial in Pina's decades-old murder conviction.

Attorney Ian MacLean, for the Commonwealth, told the court the motion judge committed a series of legal errors when he allowed the third motion for a new trial, focusing first on the treatment records that included a Post-it note. MacLean said the defendants never satisfied the Bishop protocol in effect at the time of the 1990s trial and that the motion judge made "zero relevant factual findings" that the records contained impeachment material; he added that the proffered experts were speculative and "would never have been allowed to testify at trial." MacLean also argued the judge failed to weigh any claimed impeachment value against the strength of the Commonwealth's case (citing a separate percipient witness, Hall, and an admission by the defendant) as required by precedent.

A central dispute before the court was whether the mere existence of psychiatric treatment records justified judicial review under Bishop-Fuller as opposed to the later Dwyer protocol. MacLean pointed to Bourgeois (2007) to argue that a record's mere existence does not clear the initial burden. The bench pressed whether hospitalization or suicidal ideation would necessarily bear on perception, memory, or truthfulness; MacLean replied that such conditions are only relevant if the symptoms demonstrably affect witness competence.

MacLean further disputed the import of a pair of police forms related to a stolen vehicle that defense counsel describes as linking two other suspects to the crime. He said the reports contained inconsistent timestamps and that the defendant failed to prove the stolen vehicle was taken before the murder, so the documents lacked a "substantial connecting link" to support third-party-culprit evidence. On DNA, MacLean argued the record shows the evidentiary hearing was limited in scope and that allowing a new trial without a proper evidentiary hearing was legally erroneous.

Defense counsel Jill Tessier, representing Stephen Pina, told the court Pina was released from prison four years ago after serving 28 years, and she urged the justices to affirm Judge Krupp's decision. Tessier said newly available eyewitness-identification science, psychiatric and substance-use records for a key witness, and modern DNA results excluding Pina from parts of the murder weapon and the victim's clothing together provide "compelling, substantial connecting links" to third-party suspects Brian Johnson and Anthony Woods and justify relief under Rule 30.

Tessier described investigative materials showing that Johnson allegedly stole the murder weapon from his father, that Johnson and Woods were later arrested in a maroon Nissan matching witness descriptions, and that prosecutor files contained pages tracking their cases. She also pointed out inconsistencies and timing issues in the carjacking victim's reports (one report listed 10:00 or 10:40 p.m.; an officer's note listed 9:30 p.m.) and said the victim did not report the theft until the following morning, leaving no contemporaneous 911 or dispatch record to fix the time.

On the psychiatric records and expert testimony, Tessier described two experts who would have provided context linking the witness's diagnoses and substance-use history to risks of misidentification and faulty memory. She said cross-examination at trial had been limited and that jurors were denied expert tools the court now recognizes as part of modern eyewitness-identification science (the court's recent decisions referenced by counsel include Gaines and Mercado).

Both sides acknowledged the motion judge applied a cumulative, fact-specific Rule 30 analysis. Tessier argued that the combination of third-party leads, expert eyewitness analysis, mental-health evidence, and DNA results created a "perfect storm of injustice" that fell within Judge Krupp's discretion.

The court heard extended questioning from the bench — including from Justice Wolohojian and Justice Gaziano — on the admissibility of the experts, the sufficiency of factual findings, the timing discrepancies in the police reports, and whether an evidentiary hearing was required for DNA issues. The justices did not issue a ruling at argument; a decision is pending.