Appeals court hears challenge to Mansia conviction over jury unanimity and counsel performance

The Utah Court of Appeals heard argument in State v. Mansia, where appellate counsel for Jose Mansia argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a specific unanimity instruction that, he said, left an unreasonable risk of a non‑unanimous verdict in the felony discharge‑of‑a‑firearm charge.

Eric, counsel for appellant Jose Mansia, told the court that the jury was given a general unanimity instruction while the elements instruction presented four alternative ways to convict; he said that allowed a reasonable probability that jurors convicted based on different acts. "There's a reasonable probability that the jurors did not unassely agree upon which alleged act Messia committed," Eric argued, pressing that the omission was prejudicial given the party‑liability theory used at trial.

The panel pressed the counsel on practical consequences. "If the jury can't agree on who the shooter was, everybody walks," Judge Oliver asked, outlining the defense's position that without a specific unanimity instruction, jurors could convict under different theories without agreeing on the same act. The court and counsel discussed whether, under party liability, jurors must unanimously agree on the particular act that made each defendant culpable.

Counsel also raised related instructional and evidence issues: the absence of statutory definitions for intentional, knowing, and reckless in the instructions and a lack of forensic evidence (for example, no gunpowder residue was identified at trial), which counsel said could have changed the outcome for the minor defendant who was tried jointly with adults.

The panel further questioned whether a statutory amendment that occurred while Mansia's case was pending — which changed when certain juveniles could be charged or the forum in which they could be prosecuted — should be treated as procedural or substantive for retroactivity purposes. Appellant argued the amendment was procedural because it altered the judicial machinery available to the State; the court probed whether the amendment nonetheless produced substantive differences in liability and sentencing and how that affects retroactivity analysis.

State counsel Daniel Day responded that the ineffective‑assistance claims fail and defended counsel's trial choices as objectively reasonable in a joint trial involving three defense attorneys. The State characterized the multiple theories advanced at trial as alternative modes for proving a single felony discharge count rather than separate acts requiring individual unanimity. Day cited precedent distinguishing alternative means from multiple acts and urged that the record supported the State's intent theory directed at the victims who were driven past and shot at.

The panel asked multiple probing questions about the standards used to judge counsel performance (Primo/Strickland), whether the presence of multiple defense counsel colors that analysis, and how existing precedents apply in multi‑defendant trials. Counsel noted that the issue of unanimity and principal/accomplice liability is also under more focused review in a pending matter (Fitzwater) before the court.

After rebuttal and additional questions, the court took the appeal under advisement and said it would issue a decision as soon as practicable.

The court heard further matters after recess and reconstituted the panel for a second argument.