Citizen Portal
Sign In

Get Full Government Meeting Transcripts, Videos, & Alerts Forever!

Get email alerts on the Criminal Justice topic

No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.

Court considers whether mandatory permanent criminal‑stalking injunction applies and an expungement challenge in State v. Thalib

Utah Court of Appeals · January 8, 2026
AI-Generated Content: All content on this page was generated by AI to highlight key points from the meeting. For complete details and context, we recommend watching the full video. so we can fix them.

Summary

In State v. Thalib the panel debated whether statutory language and precedent require a permanent criminal‑stalking injunction at conviction, and whether the district court properly denied the defendant’s petition for expungement. The court heard competing readings of Rule 30B, Rule 22(e) and prior case law and took the matter under advisement.

The Utah Court of Appeals heard argument in State v. Thalib about whether a district court must issue a permanent criminal‑stalking injunction at the time of conviction and whether a later sentencing modification and the denial of expungement were lawful.

Defense counsel Lori Sepi argued that once a judgment is entered the sentencing court ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to reopen it and that Rule 30B — the rule that corrects clerical errors — does not apply because the asserted error was judicial, not clerical. Sepi told the court that the sentencing transcript and subsequent orders should be read together and that the record supports a discretionary reading of the stalking injunction statute: the 2012 and later statutory language she cited includes qualifiers such as “where appropriate” or “where necessary” and a provision that an injunction “may be filed,” which she said permits a district court to decline to impose a permanent criminal‑stalking injunction in some cases.

The state, represented by Joshua Prince, urged a different reading: the state argued the statute requires entry of a permanent criminal‑stalking injunction at conviction to ensure victims’ protection, even though the particular relief under the injunction (specific contact limits, custody/parenting matters) is tailored by the court. Prince said that if the statute were not mandatory as Croft (as cited in argument) interpreted it, then Rule 22(e) could apply to correct an omitted mandatory term and the district court’s reopening of the judgment would be lawful.

The panel questioned both lawyers about the interplay between the statutory text, post‑2012 amendments, and Croft‑era precedent; one judge pressed whether the legislature’s later amendments would have plainly overruled any earlier contrary interpretation. Counsel also debated the district court’s public‑interest analysis in denying expungement and whether the record supported the court’s findings about persistence of conduct, references in pre‑sentence materials and the defendant’s post‑conviction conduct.

After argument the panel took the matters under advisement. The appellate decision will resolve whether the permanent criminal‑stalking injunction is mandatory under the statutory scheme as applied to the defendant’s 2017 conviction and whether the district court’s expungement determination should be vacated or remanded for further proceedings.