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U.S. Helsinki Commission briefing: experts say Russia's occupation has militarized the Zaporizhzhia plant and strained nuclear protections

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission): House Commission · March 17, 2026
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Summary

At a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe briefing, three experts warned that Russia's seizure and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has turned a civilian facility into a fortified military position, imperiled staff and weakened existing legal protections; panelists urged stronger norms and technical resilience.

At a briefing convened by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the U.S. Helsinki Commission), panelists said Russia's seizure and ongoing occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southeastern Ukraine has transformed the facility from civilian infrastructure into a military asset and a diplomatic bargaining chip.

"Russian forces have transformed the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant into a fortified military position," said Bob Wagner, a senior defense analyst, emergency manager and U.S. Navy Reserve officer. Wagner told commissioners that the plant's loss of off-site power and Russia's broader attacks on Ukraine's electrical grid can be used to "weaponize winter" by depriving civilians of heating and electricity.

Mariana Budjeryn, a senior researcher at the Center for Nuclear Security Policy in MIT's Security Studies Program, said the ZNPP occupation is unprecedented in modern warfare because it involved an armed assault on an operating plant and, afterward, alleged coercion and mistreatment of Ukrainian staff. "I have talked to people who were being tortured, who were held without provision of food and water," Budjeryn said, describing testimony from evacuated operators and what she termed pressure to sign contracts with Rosatom or accept Russian passports.

James Acton, Jessica T. Matthews Chair and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, urged stronger legal and normative barriers against attacks on nuclear power plants. "We should just say that we will not attack nuclear power plants in a time of war," Acton said, proposing that a clear unilateral U.S. policy could raise the normative cost of such attacks and encourage other states to follow.

Panelists reviewed technical and legal vulnerabilities. Speakers noted that ZNPP produced a substantial share of Ukraine's prewar electricity (panelists variously cited figures such as about 20% or "roughly one quarter") and that the plant's reactors were placed in cold shutdown on September 12, 2022. Budjeryn told the panel she estimates roughly a month of buffer time to respond if backup generators and cooling systems failed completely; Wagner and others warned that spent-fuel pools and the broader electricity estate remain significant vulnerabilities.

On the role of Rosatom, Budjeryn said the company functions as part of the occupying apparatus at the plant and in the city of Enerhodar, and she cited a report by the Ukrainian NGO TruthHounds alleging complicity by Rosatom employees in abuses of plant staff. Panelists noted that sanctioning Rosatom poses technical and political challenges because of its large market role in enrichment and fuel services and existing commercial ties.

During audience questions, Alana Nowetzky of the U.S. Helsinki Commission asked whether states expanding civilian nuclear infrastructure in the region, such as Lithuania, should take added precautions. Wagner recommended building safety and security resilience into bilateral arrangements and stressed the need to consider grid resilience and personnel protections in new agreements.

An audience member identified in the transcript as Miro Slovak Gunkadze asked about global security implications and whether International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring is sufficient after more than three years of occupation. Acton and Budjeryn warned the occupation sets a dangerous precedent, urged long-term measures to deter and punish violations, and cautioned that a resolution for ZNPP is likely tied to the broader conflict's outcome. Budjeryn reiterated that most original Ukrainian staff have left since the reactors were placed in cold shutdown and that those remaining have, in effect, been coopted or replaced, reducing some immediate staffing risks but leaving large quantities of nuclear material and opportunities for malicious actors.

The briefing included no votes or formal actions. Wagner offered to submit a Naval Postgraduate School report with policy recommendations for the record. The session closed with no formal decisions and no announced next meeting date.