Appeals court hears whether repeated domestic abuse can be treated as a single continuing wrong in Booth v. Tavakoli

Vancouver — The Washington Court of Appeals, Division 2, heard oral argument on May 1 in Booth v. Tavakoli over whether repeated acts of domestic violence should be treated as one continuous course of conduct for purposes of the statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

Acting Chief Judge Eric Price presided with a multi‑judge panel. Appellant counsel Jeff Keddy, of Northwest Justice Project, argued that the abuse alleged by Soraya Booth — which he said began in April 2019 and culminated in a June 1, 2020 incident — should be viewed as a continuous whole so that earlier acts are not time‑barred for damages calculation. "Domestic violence is about power and control in a relationship," Keddy told the court, and, he added, the facts in this case show "a continuous process" within the roughly 14‑month period at issue.

Keddy pointed the court to RCW 4.16.080 and to decisions recognizing the continuing‑tort doctrine, urging a narrow ruling limited to cases with similar fact patterns rather than a categorical rule that would sweep in distant, discrete incidents. He also cited recent legislative developments expanding the statutory understanding of coercive control and argued those policy changes supported a continuity approach.

Respondent counsel Roger Bennett, arguing for Dr. Tavakoli, told the court the appeal is a statute‑of‑limitations dispute, not a vehicle to create new policy. Bennett characterized the allegations as assaults and batteries that were subject to shorter limitation periods and argued the plaintiff cannot "disguise" an assault as IIED to evade the applicable limitations window. "You can't double up and avoid the statute of limitations by just calling it infliction of emotional distress," Bennett said, citing Rice v. Janovich and other Washington precedent to support his view that emotional‑distress recovery tied to assault may be subsumed within assault/battery remedies.

Bennett acknowledged that equitable tolling exists but argued it does not apply here because, he said, the plaintiff had counsel and time to file within the statutory periods. He urged the court that any change in how domestic‑violence victims are treated under the statute should be undertaken by the legislature, not the courts.

During argument the panel questioned both sides about breadth and consequences. One judge asked whether recognizing a broad continuous‑wrong rule might reach facts in which incidents are separated by many years, while Keddy urged the court to confine any ruling to cases like Booth where the alleged abuse was concentrated and the relationship exhibited continuing patterns of control.

In rebuttal Keddy said there were post‑June‑1 acts relevant to IIED, including repeated alleged violations of a no‑contact order and attempts to contact the plaintiff through third parties, and he argued those acts could support an IIED claim separate from the assault. "There's additional facts and evidence that support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim beyond the assault," he told the panel.

The court took the case under advisement and announced it would take the remainder of its calendar without further oral argument. A written decision will follow.

Background: Counsel cited RCW 4.16.080 and Washington case law on accrual and continuing‑tort doctrines; the parties debated the applicability of Rice v. Janovich and equitable‑tolling principles. The superior court had denied summary judgment as to the June 1, 2020 incident but granted it for pre‑May 31, 2020 acts, which is the central issue on appeal.

Next step: The Court of Appeals will issue a written opinion resolving whether, on these facts, the alleged pattern of domestic abuse should be treated as a single continuing wrong for statute‑of‑limitations purposes.