Appeals panel hears arguments in Bloom v. York over pre-filing restrictions under abuse-of-litigation law

An appellate panel heard oral argument in the appeal by Gina Bloom challenging a trial court's pre-filing restriction under the state's Abuse of Litigation Act. Risham Nazar, counsel for appellant Gina Bloom, told the panel the issue turns on statutory interpretation and the required sequence of findings before a court may treat past filings as evidence of 'abusive litigation.

"This appeal essentially is centered on the Abuse of Litigation Act," Nazar said, urging the court to reverse the trial court's order that limited Bloom's ability to file without pre-filing review. Nazar argued the statute's definition provisions must be read together and in sequence, and that the trial court improperly relied on previously granted protection orders and other prior proceedings without satisfying the statutory criteria for abusive litigation.

Kevin Hohalter, counsel for respondent Brian Yorks, asked the panel to affirm. "Gina Bloom has engaged in a relentless campaign to convince every new forum she appears in that in the relationship between her and Brian Yorks, there is only one true victim, her, and one true abuser," Hohalter said, arguing Bloom repeatedly reasserted allegations that had already been decided and used procedural mechanisms to relitigate settled matters. He pointed the panel to two motions'a CR 60 motion and a motion to realign'as examples on the record that, he said, meet the statutory criteria for abusive litigation.

Judges on the panel pressed both sides on statutory mechanics and context. One judge asked whether the court should evaluate the definition subsection and the procedural subsection together to determine when a party may request a restriction and whether preliminary findings are required before a court treats prior litigation as evidence. Counsel for Bloom countered that the trial court's written order lacked a clear, subsection-by-subsection abusive-litigation analysis and that parts of the order amounted to a subject-matter restriction on litigation that the statute does not authorize.

Hohalter responded that responsive pleadings can be abusive if they repackage adjudicated claims and overwhelm new factfinders. He told the panel the trial court's finding was supported by the record and by the statutory presumption the court applied, and that the presumption had not been rebutted. Hohalter also noted that a carve-out the trial court had allowed for an ongoing relocation action is now moot because the parties settled that action, leaving the pre-filing restriction operative.

Nazar said the carve-out'and the court's subject-matter limits'illustrate the punitive reach of the order and argue it created an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech by forbidding mention of certain topics in filings. She asked the panel to reverse the order in full, or at minimum to strike the subject-matter restriction.

The advocates also referenced limited appellate precedent. Nazar noted a scarcity of published decisions applying the Abuse of Litigation Act and warned against trial courts overreading one earlier case cited in briefing. Hohalter said the record contains multiple filings and findings that, when viewed together, support the trial court's outcome.

The appeals panel heard argument from both sides and asked several procedural and contextual questions about the statutory language, the chronology of domestic-violence protection orders, and how the presumption of abusive intent should operate. The panel did not announce a decision at the conclusion of the oral argument.