Court hears dispute over whether diminished capacity can negate intent if defendant believed victim was nonhuman

At oral argument in the Other Court, Mary Swift, defense counsel for Mr. Foulkes, told the panel that the first-degree murder statute’s phrase "premeditated intent to cause the death of another person" requires a specific intent to kill a human being, and she asked the court to allow a diminished-capacity defense that would negate that element in this case.

Swift said an expert would testify that Mr. Foulkes’ psychotic delusions impaired his capacity to form the specific intent to kill a human; she urged the court to apply established statutory-construction principles (citing Flores-Figueroa from the U.S. Supreme Court) and precedent to treat the "of another person" clause as requiring knowledge that the victim is human. "Mister Fulk did not have intent to kill a human being," Swift argued, and asked the court to reverse the trial court’s preclusion of the diminished-capacity defense.

Andrea Vitilich, for the State and the King County Prosecutor’s Office, countered that the trial court correctly found not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered civil commitment. Vitilich said the key question is whether the defendant had the capacity to form a premeditated intent — not whether he was mistaken about surrounding facts. "Mister Foulkes fully intended to kill Mister Peterman. He premeditated that intent. He admitted as much repeatedly and adamantly," Vitilich told the court, arguing that delusions about the victim’s nature do not necessarily show lack of capacity to form intent to kill.

The court questioned both sides on whether an expert’s opinion could improperly resolve a legal element and explored policy consequences if the diminished-capacity defense were read to turn on the precise content of a defendant’s delusion. Prosecutors argued such an interpretation could lead to absurd results — for example, a defendant repeatedly released because each time he believed his victim was nonhuman — while defense counsel emphasized that civil-commitment or involuntary-treatment procedures, not unmonitored release, can follow an acquittal based on mental-state defenses. Swift noted both experts recommended referral to a designated crisis responder and that involuntary-treatment processes can involve holds of up to 180 days.

The argument focused on whether Washington law treats first-degree murder as a specific-intent offense requiring knowledge of the victim’s humanness and whether diminished capacity can negate that element when the defendant believed the victim was not human. Counsel for both sides cited case law and expert opinions; neither side received an on-the-record decision at the conclusion of oral argument.

The court thanked counsel and the argument concluded; no ruling was announced from the bench in the transcript provided.