Get Full Government Meeting Transcripts, Videos, & Alerts Forever!
Get email alerts on the Identification Suppression topic
No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.
Defense urges suppression of 'show-up' identification in Commonwealth v. Rentas, citing visible victim property
Summary
In Commonwealth v. Rentas, defense counsel argued the trial judge erred by denying suppression of a one-on-one identification after police placed the victim's green laptop in view; the Commonwealth told the court the record does not show deliberate staging and that other evidence makes any error nonprejudicial.
Jennifer Cox, counsel for defendant Alexander Rentas, told the three-judge panel that the lower court should have suppressed the victim's out-of-court identification because police conduct made the one-on-one “show-up” unduly suggestive. Cox argued a critical fact at the suppression hearing was that "Sergeant Avery removed . . . the victim's green laptop from inside a bag inside the vehicle before she arrived," placed it on the car, and that sequence increased the risk of an irreparable misidentification.
The panel — introduced by Peter Sachs and consisting of Justice Sabida Singh and Justice Christopher Hodgins — pressed counsel on the chronology and what the victim actually saw. The court pointed out the motion judge found the victim identified the defendant before testifying she recognized her laptop, and asked whether the defense was disputing that factual finding; Cox said she did not dispute the judge's factual findings but argued the legal conclusion should differ when the totality of the circumstances is considered.
Commonwealth counsel Catherine Semmel responded that the police had a "good reason" to conduct a prompt show-up given the serious nature of the offense, and that the record does not demonstrate deliberate staging. Semmel told the court it was unclear from the suppression record whether the victim, while sitting in the cruiser, could actually see the laptop on the trunk; she also argued the victim's equivocal identification (about 60% confidence) and strong additional evidence — surveillance video showing a shirt with a visible emblem, booking photos, property on the defendant at arrest and denominations of money consistent with the victim's loss — reduce the risk that any improperly admitted identification was prejudicial.
The panel repeatedly tested whether excluding the ID would leave the Commonwealth’s case in equipoise, and whether the identification's limited confidence and the other circumstantial evidence would allow a conviction to stand. Counsel on both sides agreed the court must apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test for suggestive identifications and then evaluate prejudice in the sufficiency analysis.
The arguments concluded without a decision from the bench; the court thanked counsel and moved to the next case. The court may issue a written opinion addressing whether the show-up should have been suppressed and, if so, whether the error was prejudicial enough to require a new trial.
