Board of Adjustment sides with homeowner in Currituck County window‑tinting dispute

The Currituck County Board of Adjustment voted 3–2 on June 8, 2026, to find that county staff erred in treating a home‑based window‑tinting business at 2388 Tolls Creek Road as "automotive repair and the like," overturning a notice of violation against the owner of 25210 LLC.

The dispute centered on whether prisoned tinting activity qualifies as a home occupation under the county’s Unified Development Ordinance. County planning staff argued that window tinting is most similar to vehicle sales and services or automotive repair and therefore is excluded from the list of allowable home occupations. "We concluded that the use was similar to vehicle sales and service and automotive repair use," Planning and Inspections Director Jenny Turner testified during the hearing.

County code enforcement officer Michelle Rogers told the board she opened a second investigation after receiving neighborhood complaints and social‑media posts and that, over several drive‑by inspections and a review of online photographs, she observed activity she said supported a determination that the business was operating on the parcel. Rogers also testified she personally saw a vehicle enter the garage and later leave with newly tinted windows: "I actually saw a vehicle that went in and approximately an hour and a half later went back out with a nice new tent." The county admitted an agenda packet, but the board struck portions of the packet after objections over foundation and hearsay.

The applicant, Gavin Kick, testified that he operates a window‑tinting service from one bay of a three‑bay detached garage and that much of his work is performed off‑site. Kick described the tinting process as a non‑mechanical service: "You wet the window ... lay it on the window itself, and then squeegee it out," and said he uses soap and water and no noisy, motorized equipment. Neighbors who live adjacent to the property testified that the operation has not changed the character of the neighborhood; one neighbor, Caitlyn Stits, told the board she had "never heard [the business] once" and described Kick as "respectful, polite, and incredibly quiet."

Board members debated two related questions: whether staff followed the ordinance’s procedure for interpreting uses not expressly listed in the UDO (the "unlisted uses" process) and whether staff’s factual finding was supported by the evidence. Staff cited UDO provisions that allow the director to interpret unlisted uses by considering factors such as the nature and duration of the activity, storage and display, number of customers and employees, parking and transportation impacts, and nuisances such as noise, odor or fumes.

Appellant counsel pressed that the county had not proved key specifics required by the home‑occupation standards — for example, an on‑site measurement of the area used for the business — and argued that tinting is a low‑impact service that does not produce the noise, traffic or outdoor storage commonly associated with automotive repair. Turner and Rogers acknowledged some points were unresolved in the record: staff’s square‑foot calculation for the bay was an approximation (agenda packet cited "approximately 1,289 square feet") and some spreadsheets and third‑party online items were either struck or excluded for lack of foundation.

After deliberation, the board moved under the appeal‑review standards to conclude that "the decision maker made an error in applying a standard or measuring a standard," a finding that the majority said reflected both legal and evidentiary gaps in staff’s approach. The board instructed counsel to draft an order memorializing the ruling; members indicated the chair may sign the order if counsel agree on language.

The board’s action does not amend the Unified Development Ordinance. It resolves the appeal of the notice of violation for 25210 LLC; the county may accept the board’s order or pursue further legal steps allowed under state and local law.

What happens next: the board directed county and appellant counsel to draft a written order reflecting the 3–2 decision. The order will be circulated to members for review and the chair was authorized to sign it if counsel can agree on final wording.