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Washington Supreme Court weighs whether mental‑health sentencing alternative waives mandatory deadly‑weapon enhancements
Summary
At oral argument in State v. Scott Perrin, the state urged the court to reverse a Court of Appeals ruling that allowed trial courts to waive deadly‑weapon enhancements when imposing the mental‑health sentencing alternative (MHSA). Defense counsel urged affirmance, saying the MHSA’s plain language and the rule of lenity require waiving confinement time.
The Washington State Supreme Court on June 16 heard competing legal arguments over whether the mental‑health sentencing alternative (MHSA) permits trial courts to waive statutorily mandatory deadly‑weapon enhancements.
Aaron Bartlett, counsel for the State, told the justices that the deadly‑weapon enhancement statute uses multiple mandatory cues—including a longstanding "notwithstanding" clause and repeated "shall" language—so the enhancement must be imposed even when a sentencing alternative is selected. "The deadly weapon enhancement is mandatory and must be imposed," Bartlett said, arguing the Court of Appeals erred by failing to harmonize the two statutes and by relying on the rule of lenity to nullify the enhancement statute.
Jennifer Swigert, counsel for respondent Scott Perrin, urged the court to affirm the Court of Appeals. Swigert argued the MHSA's plain text—"shall waive imposition of the sentence within the standard range"—includes the enhancements and that, if ambiguity remains, the rule of lenity requires the interpretation most favorable to the defendant. "The mental health sentencing alternative waives all confinement time," Swigert told the court, adding that legislative purpose and amici research indicate incarceration can exacerbate serious mental illness.
Several justices pressed both sides on operational consequences. One asked whether an enhancement could ever be the only confinement time a defendant serves (for example, when statutory maximums truncate the base term), and another questioned how enhancement time could be reconciled procedurally with community‑based treatment under the MHSA. Bartlett conceded scenarios may exist in which a defendant serves only enhancement time in limited statutory contexts but maintained that potential operational oddities do not excuse failing to harmonize statutes or negate the enhancement's mandatory language.
Swigert responded that the legislature drafted the MHSA and related eligibility rules without excluding defendants subject to enhancements, and that where the legislature wanted to preserve enhancements for specific alternatives it has done so in the past (for example, by making certain defendants ineligible for other alternatives). She argued courts should interpret ambiguous penal provisions in the defendant's favor when legislative intent is not clearly expressed.
Both sides cited this court's precedent and Court of Appeals decisions on whether enhancements are part of the SRA standard range. Counsel also debated statutory mechanics—how enhancements are added to a standard‑range calculation, and what the MHSA's waiver language means when read alongside the deadly‑weapon statute.
The court thanked counsel, took the case under advisement and recessed for 10 minutes. No decision was announced from the bench.
What happens next: The court will issue a written opinion resolving whether the MHSA allows courts to waive deadly‑weapon enhancements; that opinion will determine whether trial courts may omit enhancement confinement time when imposing community‑based, treatment‑focused sentences.
