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Washington Supreme Court hears dispute over inspectors''' entry to secured gym during pandemic
Summary
On May 19 the Washington State Supreme Court heard arguments in Bradshaw Development Inc. v. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries about whether workplace inspectors may follow a gym member through a key-card door ("tailgate") and whether that circumstance defeats a business'''s reasonable expectation of privacy under state law and the state constitution.
The Washington State Supreme Court heard oral arguments May 19 in Bradshaw Development Inc. v. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, a case that asks when workplace inspectors may enter a secured commercial facility without a warrant.
William Henry, counsel for the Department of Labor and Industries, told the court that L&I seeks a narrow ruling: "Commercial gym that's advertising to the public that it's open, it's admitting members of the public into its facility, and it's selling gym memberships to new customers has no reasonable expectation of privacy." Henry pointed to an open sign and the presence of customers and new-members signing up as evidence the facility was holding itself out to the public.
Opposing counsel Austin Hatcher argued that a locked door and membership controls can show a subjective manifestation of privacy that the statute contemplates must be respected. Hatcher asked the court to read the statutory warrant process into the analysis, citing the administrative warrant provisions in RCW 49.17.070 and RCW 49.17.075 and saying inspectors "illegally obtained entry to the premises in order to conduct a search." He warned that allowing warrantless entry whenever a member lets an inspector in would undercut the protection the statute and the Fourth Amendment provide secured premises.
Several justices pushed both sides with hypotheticals focused on method of entry and safety: whether entering through a window or forcing a locked door would be permitted (both counsel said unsafe or clearly unlawful methods would be disallowed), whether following a member through an unlocked door differs constitutionally from using a key-card entry, and whether an exterior "open" sign or a chalkboard could supply enough information for an administrative warrant. One justice noted the record statement that L&I waited "52 days" before entering; counsel acknowledged delays and prior warnings but referred to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals' factual finding that employees were inside when inspectors entered.
Henry emphasized that Bradshaw bore the burden of proving a constitutionally protected privacy interest and said Bradshaw offered no evidence about membership policies or other privacy-protecting practices. Hatcher disagreed, arguing the business model (key-card access, membership lists) can create a subjective manifestation of privacy and that the statutory scheme offers a warrant process when the State needs to inspect secured areas.
The justices explored whether the court could resolve the case on the statutory definition of a "reasonably recognizable entry point" and avoid broader constitutional questions; both sides said the statutory text and the presence or absence of a key-card entry are central to the outcome.
The case was submitted after closing arguments; the court took no immediate action from the bench. A decision is expected in a written opinion that will clarify whether, and in what circumstances, tailgating into a locked, membership-controlled facility permits warrantless inspections under Washington law.
