Appeal over Seattle Housing Authority eviction rule turns on whether service alone meets RCW 59.18.190’s 60‑day "pursuit" requirement

In oral argument before an appellate panel, Charles Lynn, counsel for the Housing Authority of the City of Seattle, urged the court to hold that commencing an unlawful‑detainer action by serving a summons and complaint satisfies the "pursue a remedy" requirement in RCW 59.18.190's 60‑day timeline after an eviction notice.

"And that commencing the action in Washington is by serving summons and complaint on the tenant," Lynn told the panel, citing the Residential Landlord‑Tenant Act and Washington precedent that identifies service as one means by which an action is commenced. Lynn argued that the statute and court rules permit either filing or service to commence an action and that filing the complaint need not occur within 60 days under RCW 59.18.370.

Ashley O'Brien of the Housing Justice Project, representing respondent Joan Nguyen, countered that while service can commence an unlawful‑detainer action, it is not equivalent to "pursuing a remedy" under RCW 59.18.190. "The timeline commences when the notice is served and that failure to pursue a remedy within that timeline requires dismissal," O'Brien said, urging the court to affirm the trial court's dismissal where, she stated, the landlord did not file the case within 60 days.

The panel pressed both sides on statutory harmonization across the RLTA and related civil rules. One member asked how provisions that contemplate service after filing for show‑cause hearings fit with a strict reading of the 60‑day pursuit requirement; counsel on both sides agreed the chapter contains overlapping language that requires careful harmonization. The discussion ranged over RCW 59.18.190 (the 60‑day provision), RCW 59.18.370 (permitting filing at or after commencement), and RCW 59.18.181 (limited landlord remedies such as entering to cure certain lease violations).

Respondent counsel emphasized tenant protections and the real‑world consequences of unresolved summonses: she told the panel the Housing Authority served a summons and then took no further court action for roughly five months, and that meetings with the tenant documented in the record did not clearly reflect settlement negotiations that would amount to pursuing relief. Appellant counsel replied that the ability to commence by service facilitates negotiation and can protect tenants by avoiding immediate public docketing of eviction filings.

Both sides acknowledged that civil rules allow a defendant, in ordinary civil actions, to insist the plaintiff file the case after being served with process; the panel and counsel discussed remedies for unreasonable delay, including failure‑to‑prosecute motions and other court remedies when service is not followed by diligent steps to obtain relief.

The panel did not announce a decision at argument. The court recessed after hearing counsel's final remarks; no opinion was issued from the bench at the close of argument.