Appellate panel hears dispute over converting scheduled stock transfers into $340,000 judgment in Silva v. Mienker

An appellate panel heard arguments in Silva v. Mienker over whether a trial court may convert a divorce-decree provision requiring quarterly stock transfers into a money judgment for $340,000.

Appellant counsel Matthew Yetter, arguing for Heather Silva, told the panel the respondent was awarded the family home in the 2022 divorce and the decree’s paragraph 20 required quarterly stock/share transfers “until the transfer value equals $340,000.” Yetter said the respondent made no transfers and that the superior court’s entry of a $340,000 judgment was a permissible enforcement of the decree, citing the court’s authority to enforce property settlements under RCW 26.12.010.

Why it matters: the case asks whether converting a scheduled payment mechanism into an immediate judgment changes the parties’ negotiated bargain. If the panel treats a converted money judgment as an enforceable remedy, the appellant could secure immediate relief; if the panel treats it as a prohibited modification, the appellant may need to pursue alternative procedural remedies.

Respondent counsel Samuel Page told the panel the parties drafted their own decree and that, at the time of the divorce (July 8, 2022), the respondent’s compensation included quarterly stock grants from Lyft that later ceased when he lost that position. Page argued the remedy matters because reducing the scheduled stock-transfer obligation to an immediate money judgment would “make this the sum of money due immediately” and would impose substantial statutory judgment interest — “about $40,000 a year,” he said — neither of which paragraph 20 promised. Page said those two effects would be an impermissible modification of the decree.

Panel members pressed both sides on available remedies and timing. One judge asked whether relief under CR 60(b)(11) (vacating a judgment for extraordinary circumstances) was available and whether an 18-month delay in bringing a motion would make that remedy untimely; Page conceded that CR 60(b)(11) must be brought within a reasonable time and that timeliness is a factual question for the trial judge. Page also told the panel that other enforcement mechanisms exist and that the appellant could seek relief through different procedural vehicles, but he maintained that reducing the obligation to a judgment with immediate interest differs substantively from the parties’ negotiated quarterly-transfer arrangement.

Yetter countered that the respondent has had the benefit of the home and “is not making the payment,” and that converting to a judgment is an appropriate way for the court to compel payment when the ordered transfer method no longer functions. The panel asked whether, on remand, the trial court could craft a different enforcement remedy — for example permitting periodic payments without immediate interest until a further failure — and Yetter acknowledged that such an option would be available to a trial court deciding an appropriate remedy on remand.

The panel did not announce a decision; after questioning both sides, it thanked counsel and said it would take the remainder of its cases without further oral argument. A written opinion or order resolving whether entry of a $340,000 judgment is an impermissible modification or a permissible enforcement will resolve whether Silva must pursue a CR 60 motion or whether the judgment avenue remains open.