Washington Court of Appeals hears argument over whether Agent Grad School is a "private vocational school" under state law

The Washington Court of Appeals, Division I heard oral argument in Cara Mae Cleveland v. Agent Grad School on whether Agent Grad School (AGS), a nationwide coaching program, qualifies as a "private vocational school" under RCW chapter 28C.10 and whether that classification is a prerequisite to Cleveland’s Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim.

Counsel for AGS argued the panel should grant discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(1) and rule that the trial court erred in treating AGS as a private vocational school. Counsel (identifying attorneys Phil Tallent and Laurel Brown as representing AGS) told the court that the PVSA and related statutes focus on formal, sequenced educational programs that lead to licensure or degrees and that AGS is a coaching program that "doesn't provide for grades, doesn't provide for tests, doesn't provide for anything." The AGS side said the Workforce Training Board, created in 1991, enforces the Private Vocational Schools Act and that agency guidance about licensing steps shows the statute targets formal career schools, not commercial coaching seminars.

Blythe Chandler, counsel for Cara Mae Cleveland, urged the court to deny discretionary review. Chandler said the non-per-se CPA claim is broader than a single discount and alleges AGS induced consumers to enter contracts and pay "exorbitant, nonrefundable fees" through deceptive marketing. Chandler pointed to her client's testimony and argued the claim fits the Supreme Court's Montez framework because "a consumer could allege economic loss if... the product she received was objectively different from or less valuable than what was advertised." Chandler also cited a recent unpublished decision (State v. Jordan) that involved a membership-based workforce-accelerator program and suggested similar conduct has been treated as subject to regulation.

Both sides addressed statutory interpretation. AGS counsel pressed that courts should consider the PVSA, related statutes (chapter 28C.18), the statutory scheme, and enforcement history when deciding coverage; the respondent stressed the plain-language definition in RCW 28C.10. Counsel for AGS warned that adopting Cleveland's broad reading would sweep in many commercial seminars, while Chandler pointed to eleven statutory carve-outs in RCW 28C.10.030 that limit coverage for certain short courses, continuing education, and state-sponsored programs.

The panel questioned both parties about whether dictionary or related-statute sources may be consulted when a statute defines a term, and whether examples such as continuing legal education or commercial coaching programs (the parties discussed Tony Robbins as a hypothetical) fall within the statute. Counsel agreed the statutory text and legislative intent are central to the dispute. AGS argued further proceedings would be "useless" without a clear definition; Cleveland’s counsel replied that factual disputes about deceptive marketing and whether AGS held itself out as a school make summary judgment inappropriate.

The parties exchanged brief citations to authorities including the Montez decision, an unpublished State v. Jordan opinion, and other precedent. No certification under RAP 2.3(b)(4) existed at argument, and the court limited AGS's presentation to 2.3(b)(1) grounds and reserved one minute for rebuttal. At the close of oral argument the panel took the matter as submitted and adjourned.

The immediate procedural outcome: the court submitted the case after argument; no decision or opinion was announced from the bench. The court's ultimate ruling will determine whether Cleveland may pursue the CPA claim against AGS without proof that AGS is a licensed private vocational school under RCW chapter 28C.10.