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Washington Supreme Court hears dispute over whether an issued warrant should trigger pretrial credit in Michael Yeh case

Washington State Supreme Court · June 23, 2026
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Summary

At oral argument on June 23, defense counsel argued that pretrial credit should begin when an arrest warrant is issued even if not executed; the Snohomish County prosecutor urged a narrower rule requiring custody on the specific charge before credit attaches. The court took the case under advisement and did not rule from the bench.

The Washington State Supreme Court heard arguments June 23 in State v. Michael Steven Yeh over when credit for pretrial time served must begin, a dispute that could affect defendants held on unrelated charges in different counties.

Mark Bridal, counsel for the petitioner Michael Yeh, told the justices the court's longstanding rule from Rainier v. Smith — that "no one should serve a longer sentence simply because they are unable to post bail" — requires that credit begin when a warrant is issued, not only when it is executed. Bridal said the rule must be a "bright line" so courts do not have to conduct evidentiary hearings about whether the state was negligent in serving a warrant. "Simply the warrant is issued while the person is held in custody and they should begin accruing credit on that date," he argued.

The state, represented by Amanda Campbell, deputy prosecuting attorney for Snohomish County, urged a narrower reading. "Mr. Yeh was never in custody on the Snohomish County charges before 07/02/2024," Campbell said, arguing that Washington law ties credit for time served to being in custody on the specific charge for which credit is sought. "The line is not that credit accrues for any time a person is in custody anywhere," she said.

Justices pressed both sides on practical and doctrinal limits. One justice asked whether the due-process violation, if any, occurs when the warrant is issued or when the sentencing judge declines to award credit; another asked whether the rule counsel seeks would apply across tribal, federal, immigration or out-of-state custody. Bridal said the rule should be broad enough to avoid ad hoc, county-by-county factfinding, but acknowledged administrative and jurisdictional complexities and pointed to the Sentencing Reform Act's provisions (concurrent versus consecutive sentences) as a tool for trial judges to avoid constitutional problems in particular cases.

Campbell emphasized the sparsity of the record in Yeh's case and the practical variability of county procedures for serving warrants and transporting defendants. She told the court that if a defendant was not actually held on the particular charge—because the issuing county declined transport, for example—the defendant would not be in the class entitled to pretrial credit on that charge.

The justices also discussed operational questions: whether a defendant or counsel could have appeared earlier or sought to quash a warrant remotely, the effect of indigence where a defendant cannot post bail, and who bears the burden at sentencing to prove entitlement to credit. Counsel agreed the record in this case was incomplete on several operational points, including whether the jail's release procedures would have resulted in a hold for the Snohomish County warrant.

The court did not announce a decision. "This case is submitted," the Presiding Justice said, and the court recessed. The justices will issue their ruling in a written opinion at a later date.

This dispute centers on how courts reconcile constitutional principles protecting liberty (as articulated in Rainier v. Smith and subsequent cases) with statutory sentencing rules and practical burdens on county jails and prosecutors. Any opinion could be narrowly tailored to the facts of Mr. Yeh's case or set a broader rule affecting intercounty and interjurisdictional custody practices.

Next steps: the court has taken the case under advisement and will issue a written opinion; no oral decision was delivered from the bench.