Washington Supreme Court hears arguments on whether mental-health sentencing alternative waives deadly-weapon enhancements

The Washington State Supreme Court heard competing views June 16 on whether the mental health sentencing alternative (MHSA) allows trial judges to waive mandatory deadly-weapon sentencing enhancements.

"May it please the Court," Aaron Bartlett, counsel for the State of Washington, told the justices. Bartlett argued that the deadly-weapon enhancement statute contains multiple mandatory terms — including that the enhancement "shall" be served in total confinement and "shall" run consecutively — and that the Court of Appeals erred by allowing trial courts to waive those enhancements when imposing the MHSA. "If the deadly weapon enhancement statute is to have any substance, it must mean that courts may not deviate from the term of confinement," Bartlett said, urging the court to harmonize the statutes rather than render the weapon-enhancement statute inoperative.

Justices pressed Bartlett on mechanics and consequences. One justice asked whether enhancements count as part of the "standard range" used to determine eligibility for sentencing alternatives such as the drug-offender sentencing alternative (DOSA); Bartlett responded that enhancements are treated as part of the standard range for sentencing calculations and eligibility determinations, and he emphasized that the legislature has expressly provided exceptions in other contexts when it intended them.

Jennifer Swigert, counsel for respondent Scott Perrin, argued the MHSA's plain language and structure require waiving "the sentence within the standard range," which she said includes any added enhancements. Swigert told the court the rule of lenity requires construing any statutory ambiguity in the defendant's favor unless legislative intent to the contrary is clearly established. "The plain language of the Sentencing Reform Act, as well as the rule of lenity and the legislative purpose, all point in the same direction in this case," Swigert said, adding that incarceration often exacerbates mental illness and that forcing enhanced confinement before treatment would defeat the statute's purpose.

Bench questioning probed operational outcomes under each reading. Justices asked whether a defendant could ever serve only enhancement time, how enhancements interact with statutory maximums and community-custody terms under the MHSA (the argument included that MHSA community custody can range up to 36 months and that community-custody length ties to the standard range), and whether reading the statutes as the defense proposes would create ambiguity across the array of sentencing-alternative statutes. Counsel on both sides acknowledged limited case law directly on point and pointed to decisions such as State v. Yancey, Gutierrez, and Mohammed while disputing whether those precedents resolve the present conflict.

Both sides walked the court through practical examples. Bartlett said harmonization could preserve the enhancement while still permitting the MHSA's benefits; Swigert said that in many cases the enhancement's imposition beforehand would frustrate rehabilitative aims and that the legislature knows how to exclude enhancements when intended (citing differences with DOSA, which contains express ineligibility for defendants subject to deadly-weapon enhancements).

The parties disputed whether the Court of Appeals erred by applying the rule of lenity and whether statutory text and legislative history clearly direct a single outcome. The justices pressed on statutory construction, statutory maxima, and the real-world effects of imposing confinement before treatment.

After rebuttal from the State, Bartlett asked the court to reverse the Court of Appeals. The court thanked counsel, recessed briefly and submitted the case; no decision was given from the bench.

The court record shows the central legal question is whether the MHSA's instruction that the court "shall waive imposition of the sentence within the standard range" includes enhancements that other statutes describe as mandatory. The court took extensive questioning and argument but did not announce a ruling; a decision will be issued in due course.