Washington Supreme Court hears dispute over sudden‑incapacitation defense in Brandt v. Shaw

The Washington State Supreme Court heard oral argument on June 16 in Brandt v. Shaw, a negligence appeal that turns on the scope of Washington’s sudden‑incapacitation defense and what evidentiary showing is required at summary judgment. Petitioner Luke O'Bannon argued the Court of Appeals applied an improper post‑hoc risk test and that established precedent (Sarton and the Restatement) controls, while respondent Matthew Albrecht said the record contains insufficient evidence the stroke was incapacitating or that it occurred before the collision.

Why it matters: The court must decide whether a defendant claiming a sudden medical event as a complete bar to negligence can prevail on summary judgment without corroborating evidence that the medical event both occurred and prevented the defendant from avoiding the accident. The ruling could affect how lower courts treat similar defenses, the role of medical and present‑sense testimony at summary judgment, and whether juries or judges resolve disputed timing and causation questions.

Petitioner's argument Luke O'Bannon, arguing for the petitioner (Dr. James Shaw), told the court that the core question is “whether Washington law will continue to evaluate the defense under ordinary evidentiary principles, or whether defendants will be subjected to heightened requirements that appear nowhere in the restatement and nowhere in CR 56.” O'Bannon said the record shows Dr. Shaw suffered a stroke caused by atrial fibrillation contemporaneous with the collision and that the Court of Appeals erred by converting foreseeability into a retrospective risk assessment.

O'Bannon acknowledged that evidence can be thin when a medical event impairs memory, telling the court that sudden incapacitation “can impair your ability to understand and perceive the world around you in an accurate way and can impact memory,” and that in those circumstances a jury may need to assess the claim. He cited Sarton as the controlling approach for evaluating foreseeability and argued that observable neurological signs (for example, EMT observations that a limb was flaccid) can supply admissible corroborating evidence even if the defendant lacks contemporaneous memory.

Respondent's argument Respondent counsel Matthew Albrecht framed the facts from the plaintiffs’ perspective: “The case starts with an innocent driver who was stopped safely following all the rules and gets crashed into.” Albrecht said the defendant produced no evidence showing the stroke was incapacitating or that it occurred before the accident, arguing that absent such proof summary judgment for the plaintiff would ordinarily be appropriate.

Questions from the justices Several justices pressed both sides on timing, burden, and foreseeability. One justice observed that the record contains no clear evidence of when the stroke began and emphasized the defendant bears the burden of proving the defense at trial. Another justice raised concerns that relying on propensity or risk evidence (for example, statistics about atrial fibrillation or prior transient ischemic attacks) could create troubling policy consequences if those risk factors were treated as per se notice that someone should not be driving.

The court also debated whether the defense, if proven, operates as a complete bar to negligence claims or whether factfinders could apportion fault when both medical incapacitation and some negligent conduct (for example, distracted driving) potentially contributed to a collision. Counsel discussed standards for instructing a jury on the defense, with O'Bannon saying a jury should receive the instruction only where there is substantial evidence to support it and Albrecht stressing that the defendant must ultimately prove, by the appropriate standard, that the medical event prevented avoidance of the accident.

Procedural posture and request O'Bannon asked the court to reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his client. Albrecht countered that summary judgment for the defense was inappropriate because the record lacks evidence that the stroke rendered Dr. Shaw unable to control his vehicle.

What happened next The court thanked counsel, submitted the case, and adjourned. No decision was announced from the bench.

The case will be resolved by the court in a written opinion to follow, which will clarify whether the sudden‑incapacitation defense can be resolved on summary judgment in circumstances like those presented here or whether the question must be decided by a jury.