Justices Hear Whether New Schizophrenia Evidence Warrants New Trial in Lauren Astley Murder

Chief Justice Spud and the court heard competing arguments Wednesday over whether newly obtained psychiatric evidence should require a new trial for Nathaniel Fujita, who was convicted in the killing of Lauren Astley. Robert Shaw, attorney for Fujita, told the justices that “the record before this court contains an enormous amount of new evidence, evidence grounded in medical consensus, treatment records, science, and expert testimony,” and that the evidence “clinically confirms that Mr. Fujita is schizophrenic.”

Shaw said the motion judge erred by resolving expert credibility on the motion’s prejudice question rather than leaving credibility disputes to a jury. He urged the court to view the newly submitted medical records and expert affidavits in the light most favorable to the defendant and to remand for further proceedings, arguing the new evidence was material and undiscoverable at trial.

The Commonwealth, represented by Assistant District Attorney Ryan Rall, defended the motion judge’s decision to deny a new trial. Rall told the justices that the judge reasonably evaluated the record — including New Hampshire treatment records and later institutional behavior that the Commonwealth said showed exaggeration or malingering — and correctly concluded the defendant had not carried the burden required to overturn the conviction. “This court should affirm the conviction for the brutal murder of Lauren Astley by Nathaniel Fujita, affirm the denial of the motion for new trial,” Rall said.

Why the issue matters: The appeal raises a recurring legal question in post-conviction practice — when a judge may resolve conflicting expert opinions in deciding whether newly discovered evidence would be a "real factor" in a jury’s deliberations and whether, in particular, evidence of later psychiatric episodes can be extrapolated back to suggest a defendant was in a prodromal phase years earlier.

In argument, the defense emphasized specific items from the medical record and expert testimony it says were not available at trial: family reports and treatment notes beginning in February 2011 describing falling grades, flat affect, concrete thinking, social withdrawal and depression; later institutional records and psychiatric evaluations from 2015–2016; and expert affidavits and articles (Shaw said 82 pieces of literature were submitted) tying those symptoms into a prodromal course of schizophrenia. Shaw described Dr. Wade Myers (identified in the record as a forensic psychiatry chief at Brown University) as a defense expert who, after examining Fujita, diagnosed schizophrenia and linked the later florid psychosis back to earlier decline.

The Commonwealth countered that the New Hampshire records the defense relies on do not themselves diagnose schizophrenia and, in the government’s view, contain indications of symptom exaggeration and possible malingering. On that basis, the prosecutor said, the judge was entitled to assess the credibility of the experts’ factual interpretations. At argument the prosecutor urged the court to distinguish between gatekeeping questions of admissibility or reliability (often framed with Daubert-related language in trial contexts) and the motion-for-new-trial framework, which the Commonwealth said allows the judge — on the record before her — to resolve whether the new evidence is credible and material.

Several justices pressed both sides on the practical limits of judicial review at the prejudice stage. One justice asked, “Isn’t that the point of the motion for a new trial, where you have the evidentiary hearing and you’ve got the experts testifying?” (attributed here to Chief Justice Spud). Other justices probed whether permitting a low gatekeeping standard would undermine finality by effectively requiring retrials whenever a defendant later develops a mental-health episode and obtains a new expert opinion. Defense counsel responded that there is a limiting principle — that judges should determine whether experts are qualified and whether their methodologies are scientifically valid, but should not substitute a judge’s weighing of expert credibility for the jury’s role when the second-prong (prejudice) question remains contested.

Process issues also featured in the argument. Shaw told the court he was denied a fair opportunity to present rebuttal evidence after the Commonwealth expanded its expert disclosures shortly before the hearing, and he said motions to compel were denied despite assurances that rebuttal would be allowed. The record excerpts and timeline discussed at argument include defense assertions that the hearing concluded on February 22 and that the motion judge issued a written ruling on August 14, after a multi-month delay. The Commonwealth disputed parts of that process narrative, saying the defense had opportunities to submit additional materials and that the motion judge correctly considered the detailed disclosures and records in reaching her decision.

At the end of argument the defense asked the appeals court to remand the case for further proceedings; the Commonwealth asked the court to affirm the denial of the new-trial motion. The justices did not issue a ruling from the bench at argument.

Context and background: At trial the defense presented psychiatric evidence suggesting a psychotic break might explain Fujita’s conduct; defense counsel argued that additional, later institutional records and recent psychiatric evaluations establish that Fujita has schizophrenia and that the disorder’s prodromal phase began years earlier. The prosecutor pointed to evidence from the time around the killing — including the defendant’s conduct before and after the offense, efforts to conceal the crime, and statements to police — that the Commonwealth contends are inconsistent with a precipitating psychotic break. The parties and several justices discussed case law the attorneys cited by name in argument (cases counsel referred to variously as Reberio/Roberio, Bonnet, Crowell, Hampton, Pike, and others) that they said bear on who should resolve credibility and materiality at the post-trial motion stage.

What’s next: The court’s eventual written decision will resolve whether the lower court properly weighed expert testimony and whether the new medical evidence, as a legal and factual matter, requires a new trial or remand for further proceedings.