Supreme Court hears arguments in Rivers v. Guerrero over whether AEDPA bars mid‑appeal habeas amendments

The Supreme Court heard argument in Rivers v. Guerrero (No. 231345) about whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) bars a prisoner from asking a district court to consider new claims or new evidence when the prisoner's first federal habeas appeal is still pending.

Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Brueland, told the justices that "Congress did not slam the door on exculpatory evidence that emerges while a prisoner's first habeas case is on appeal," arguing that historical practice before AEDPA treated mid‑appeal efforts to amend as matters for the district court to decide, not as "second or successive" petitions subject to AEDPA's gatekeeping. Brueland urged the court to reverse the lower court's dismissal and remand so the district court could consider the new material, saying in argument, "This court should reverse and remand."

Opposing counsel answered that AEDPA's text and precedent require treating filings made after a final judgment as second or successive. Mr. Nielsen told the court that the initial habeas litigation in this matter was closed: "The first petition was dismissed in 2018. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in 2022. This court denied cert in 2023. That case is done," and argued that the statute's gatekeeping provisions apply once the district court has entered judgment on the first application.

Argument focused on two related questions: (1) what "second or successive" meant when Congress enacted AEDPA in 1996 and whether historical practice supports petitioner's view; and (2) the practical procedures courts should follow if filings arrive while an appeal is pending. Petitioner counsel relied on this Court's approach in Bannister and urged that history and AEDPA's wording permit district courts to consider mid‑appeal amendments under ordinary amendment doctrine. Respondents and the United States urged reliance on Gonzales and other precedent that, they said, treats post‑judgment additions as subject to AEDPA's restrictions and, in practice, often requires consideration under Rule 60(b) or transfer to the court of appeals for AEDPA gatekeeping.

Several justices questioned whether allowing mid‑appeal amendments would undermine AEDPA's aim of finality and create workability problems for the courts. Justice Jackson pressed petitioner's counsel on the "work of the judgment" and whether the pendency of an appeal should change the statutory analysis. Other justices, including Justice Sotomayor and Justice Gorsuch, explored procedural routes—Rule 15 amendments, Rule 60(b) relief, the district court's power to issue an indicative ruling under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1, and 28 U.S.C.

Counsel on both sides asked the justices to limit the decision to a clear rule. Petitioner urged that the Court adopt a rule that does not treat mid‑appeal amendments as "second or successive" under 28 U.S.C. (the court discussed 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) by number), leaving district courts able to make a threshold jurisdictional call; respondents and the United States urged a rule that treats such filings as subject to AEDPA's gatekeeping unless and until the court of appeals vacates and remands the judgment.

The argument concluded with rebuttal and the case was submitted.

The outcome will determine whether district courts or courts of appeals are the appropriate initial gatekeepers when new evidence or claims surface while a first habeas appeal remains pending, a question with broad implications for habeas petitioners, federal courts and finality of criminal judgments.