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Per curiam opinion lets defendant press AEDPA claim that prejudicial evidence was 'clearly established' law

Term Talk Podcast from the Federal Judicial Center · October 2, 2025

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Summary

In a 7–2 per curiam ruling discussed on the Term Talk podcast, the Supreme Court held that the rule from Payne v. Tennessee can be treated as a "clearly established" rule for AEDPA review, remanding Andrew v. White for further consideration of prejudicial‑evidence due‑process claims.

The panel on the Federal Judicial Center’s Term Talk podcast reviewed Andrew v. White, a per curiam Supreme Court decision (7–2, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissenting) that clarified when a decision can provide a "clearly established" rule for review under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (AEDPA).

Panelists recounted the case facts: Brenda Andrew was convicted and sentenced to death for her husband’s murder; the state admitted evidence about her sexual history that it called irrelevant, and the Tenth Circuit denied habeas relief under AEDPA because it deemed the relevant Supreme Court language in Payne v. Tennessee to be dicta rather than a holding. The panel explained that AEDPA requires the source of "clearly established" federal law to be a prior holding of the U.S. Supreme Court, not mere dicta.

The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion reversing the lower courts, held that the rule discussed in Payne constitutes a holding and therefore can serve as "clearly established" federal law for AEDPA purposes. Unidentified Panelist (S3) summarized the effect: the Court accepted that the due‑process safety net identified in Payne can, in certain cases, be the basis for habeas relief when evidence is so prejudicial it renders a trial fundamentally unfair.

Panelists described the dissent’s critique: the dissent argued the Court did not apply the so‑called "fair‑minded jurist" test in the way it had been used for AEDPA review, and that the majority prematurely labeled Payne as clearly established without first applying the fair‑minded jurist inquiry. The majority responded that the fair‑minded jurist test is applied only after a rule is already found to be clearly established.

Unidentified Panelist (S2) called the ruling "enormous in the area of postconviction relief," saying it allows defendants to bring due‑process claims based on unduly prejudicial evidence under AEDPA where Payne supplies the governing rule; the case was remanded to allow Andrew to pursue that claim.

Panelists closed by emphasizing that the decision changes how lower courts evaluate whether Supreme Court precedent supplies a usable rule for AEDPA claims and that it may open a new avenue for some habeas petitions alleging trial‑level due‑process errors.