Senate subcommittee flags visa backlogs, staffing shortfalls and evolving threats ahead of World Cup and LA Olympics

A Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee hearing heard bipartisan warnings that visa backlogs, hiring timelines and evolving threats — including drones, improvised explosives and cyberattacks — could complicate security and travel for the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Los Angeles Olympic and Paralympic Games.

Chairman James Lankford opened the hearing by saying visa processing delays are already a practical obstacle: “visa wait times for Colombian nationals are at 18 months,” he told witnesses, adding that applicants who apply now would likely receive approval after the World Cup ends. Lankford said similar delays exist for Costa Rica and Ecuador and urged faster action on processing and workforce capacity.

The scale of the events underpinned the committee’s concern. Reynold (Rey) Hoover, chief executive officer of LA28, said the games will span 49 competition venues, a coast‑to‑coast torch relay and a national footprint that he estimated will bring “nearly 15,000,000 spectators” and more than 11,000 Olympic athletes to venues in Los Angeles, Oklahoma City and other host cities. Hoover reminded senators that the Department of Homeland Security designated the 2028 Games a national special security event and that the Secret Service is leading interagency security planning.

Gina Ligon, director of the National Counterterrorism Innovation Technology and Education Center (a DHS Center of Excellence), told the committee that threat actors are diversifying and adopting new technologies. “The diversity of credible threat actors makes preparing for them particularly difficult,” she said, listing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), unmanned aerial systems (drones), state‑sponsored actors and nihilistic violent extremists among the concerns. Ligon urged faster resourcing of DHS science and technology programs and the department’s Intelligence and Analysis (INA) branch to support local partners with joint threat assessments and behavioral threat teams.

Sean Kinder, global corporate development and strategy director at Ferrovial Airports, urged faster deployment of proven traveler‑screening technologies and staffing support. He recommended accelerated adoption of biometric processing at ports of entry, expedited rollout of computed tomography (CT) baggage machines and expanded use of artificial intelligence in baggage screening to speed throughput while preserving security. Kinder said some technologies are already in pilot use (he cited recent deployments in a subset of airports) and argued many can be scaled quickly if procurement and staffing timelines are shortened.

On workforce, witnesses and senators repeatedly cited multi‑year hiring timelines. Kinder and witnesses told the committee that hiring and training new Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officers can take roughly 18 months, and that personnel shortfalls — combined with technology deployment delays — risk long lines and processing bottlenecks for visitors.

Several senators focused on unmanned aerial systems. Ligon said comprehensive research on drone use in the U.S. operating environment is limited and recommended improved data collection on downed and intercepted drones and pre‑event exercises to test legal authorities and countermeasures. Hoover and other witnesses said detection capabilities exist but that “the greater challenge” is clarifying who has authority to take action once a drone is detected and ensuring state and local partners have legal and operational tools to respond.

Commitments and funding also drew attention. Hoover asked Congress to fund a 100% reimbursement mechanism for public safety staffing and material costs incurred by state and local law enforcement, fire and emergency services, and the National Guard in support of the Games; he said that reimbursement would go directly to public agencies, not to LA28. Hoover noted a 2013 NSSE (national special security event) grant program exists but has not been activated or funded and recommended reactivating that mechanism.

Lawmakers also pressed witnesses on the risk from state‑sponsored cyber operations. Ligon cited an uptick in unattributed cyber‑attacks around the Paris Olympics and warned of combined cyber and kinetic operations she said state actors such as Iran could exploit to produce cascading disruption around a major event. She said the department should plan for such complex, multi‑vector attacks.

Several senators — including Tom Moody and Maggie Hassan — emphasized the importance of ongoing intelligence sharing and relationship building among federal, state and local partners, noting past successes at repeat events such as marathons where trust and institutional memory had been built over many years.

The hearing record was left open for 15 days for additional submissions. Committee members and witnesses urged Congress and federal agencies to accelerate technology rollouts, clarify authorities for counter‑drone responses, resource INA and DHS science and technology programs, and address visa processing and staffing timelines that could otherwise leave many international spectators unable to attend.