Appellate arguments focus on whether "mailed to" means delivery or deposit in Washington garnishment law

Appellate counsel for Purdy's Public House told a three‑judge panel that a disputed phrase in Washington's garnishment statute should be read to start the seven‑day response period when mailed notices are actually delivered. "Mailed to means when the mail is delivered to the party it's sent to," said attorney Peter Schneider, who argued, "Affected parties will have no idea how much time they have" unless the court ties the clock to delivery.

The dispute centers on RCW 6.27.200 and related provisions governing garnishments and notice. Schneider said the chapter elsewhere specifies certified mail with return receipt and ties response periods to confirmed delivery, citing RCW 6.27.110 and RCW 6.27.130 to show chapter‑wide usage supports a delivery rule.

"The writ of garnishment shall be mailed…return receipt requested," Schneider said, arguing those provisions demonstrate the legislature knew how to require proof of delivery and did so where it intended to. He recounted the case's timeline: a default judgment entered years earlier, a series of garnishments, certified mail sent Feb. 4 and delivered Feb. 6, and a motion to reduce filed Feb. 13 — the dates that frame whether the appellant met the seven‑day deadline.

Respondent counsel Tim Fransen, representing PSC, urged a narrower reading of Schneider's reliance on the other provisions. "The appellant's interpretation is conceivable but not reasonable," Fransen said, arguing RCW 6.27.200 uses the disjunctive "service on or mailing to" and elsewhere speaks of "deposited in the mail" and first‑class mail as proof of mailing. He told the panel the statute provides options for notice and that in some provisions proof of deposit suffices for statutory timelines.

Judges on the panel pressed both sides on practical consequences. One judge asked what should happen in modern cases when regular mail can take more than seven days to arrive; Fransen responded that if mail delays undermine the statute's operation, the legislature should update the timeframe, but that the statute as written gives creditors certainty to enforce garnishments against nonresponsive garnishees.

Schneider countered that the statute itself contemplates mechanisms to verify delivery — affidavits of service, return receipts or returned mail — and that treating the clock as starting on actual receipt protects parties who lack prompt notice. "Seven days is not a lot of time to seek out an attorney," Schneider told the court, urging that the full seven days should be available from the date of receipt or personal service.

Neither side reported a controlling precedential answer that exactly resolves the phrase; both relied on interpretive principles and statutory context. Counsel cited case law (including State v. Brown and Chamberlain v. Department of Transportation) to support their contrasting interpretive approaches but disagreed on how to apply those precedents to the garnishment chapter.

After roughly an hour of argument and questions, the court thanked counsel for their "very enlightening arguments" and indicated it would take the matter under advisement. No decision was announced from the bench during the session.

This appeal turns on statutory interpretation of RCW 6.27.200 and related garnishment provisions; the court's ruling will determine whether the seven‑day window for motions to reduce a garnishee default begins on deposit in the mail or on actual delivery to the addressee, with practical effects for creditors and employers who receive garnishment notices.