Court of Appeals hears challenge to Tacoma Rescue Mission's land-use vesting after title dispute

The Washington Court of Appeals, Division 2, heard oral argument in an appeal over whether a proposed Tacoma Rescue Mission (TRM) homeless-housing project vested under Pierce County law after a dispute about the property's title and the completeness of the land-use application.

In opening argument, David Brickland, counsel for appellant Spanaway Concerned Citizens, said the project "is a good idea for housing for the homeless in a bad location" but argued it did not vest during the relevant six-week window because the application was incomplete and the deed showed an exclusion inserted by interlineation that was never initialed or notarized. Brickland told the panel that the applicant failed to secure subscription by every owner and that the project may be inconsistent with the county's comprehensive plan.

Chief Judge Bernard Viljesic asked a central procedural question: "How far does an examiner get to go in examining title?" Several judges pressed whether title disputes must be litigated separately in a quiet-title or writ action, or whether the hearings examiner may and should resolve ownership questions as part of the land-use review.

Margaret Archer, counsel for TRM, said the county code requires only a signed attestation that the applicant holds record title and that TRM provided that attestation. Archer told the court that TRM submitted a statutory warranty deed and that the title company corrected an earlier error and "issued $3,700,000 of insurance to verify that that is not an exception to title." She argued that Lauer, the case the appellants cite, turned on affirmative, knowing misrepresentations and is distinguishable; absent a material misrepresentation, she said, acceptance as a complete application and the examiner's review of title and title insurance support the examiner's decision.

Pierce County's counsel, David Owen, told the court that county staff (including a Mr. Jenkins) reviewed the submitted materials for content and that "it was in fact a complete application." Owen argued the staff's completeness finding is supported by substantial evidence and defended the county's use of the 4-to-1 conversion for certain sleeping units as consistent with the housing element of the comprehensive plan.

The panel and counsel also debated statutory timing. Counsel and the court discussed the roughly 28-day period for an agency to declare an application complete and whether, once accepted, later challenges to completeness or title are foreclosed absent a material misrepresentation. Appellate counsel warned that allowing late quiet-title litigation could defeat statutory deadlines, while respondents emphasized the limited circumstances in which a misrepresentation would strip an application of vesting protections.

Brickland, in rebuttal, reiterated that the interlineated deed excluded a 25-foot strip and that staff nevertheless concluded TRM owned the parcel; he argued that reliance on that excluded deed undermines any claim of substantial evidence and questioned whether deference to the examiner is appropriate for title issues.

After argument concluded, the court moved on to the next scheduled matter. The panel did not issue a decision on the record at argument; the case remains under consideration.