Supreme Court wrestles with whether obstruction statute §1512(c)(2) is limited to evidence tampering or a broad catchall

The Supreme Court heard arguments over the scope of 18 U.S.C. §1512(c)(2) in Fisher v. United States, a case that asks whether the statute is an evidence‑tampering provision or a broader obstruction clause. Petitioner’s counsel, Mister Green, urged the justices to read subsection (c)(2) in light of the enumerated acts in subsection (c)(1), saying Congress enacted the provisions after the Enron scandal to target alteration or impairment of documents and records.

“We will hear argument this morning in case 235572, Fisher versus United States,” the Court began; counsel for the petitioner opened by saying Congress enacted §1512(c) after Enron and that the statute “prohibits the impairment of the integrity or availability of information and evidence to be used in a proceeding.” Mister Green argued that the “otherwise” clause should not be used to import a free‑standing omnibus obstruction crime that would subsume the enumerated offenses.

The government, represented by General Prelogar, framed the question around January 6. “On 01/06/2021, a violent mob stormed The United States Capitol and disrupted the peaceful transition of power,” she told the justices, arguing that the plain terms of (c)(2) — “whoever corruptly obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding” — cover conduct intended to stop Congress from completing its work. The Solicitor General’s office said it has used (c)(2) in prosecutions that do not focus on document tampering, citing examples such as tipping off grand‑jury subjects and forged court orders.

Much of argument focused on how to read the word "otherwise." Several justices pressed both sides on whether the court should look at what precedes "otherwise" (the verbs and the objects in (c)(1)) to define the catchall, or whether "otherwise" means "in a different manner," allowing (c)(2) to reach obstructive conduct that does not alter or destroy documents. Petitioner relied on canons such as ejusdem generis and precedent including Begay to argue for a more limited reading; the government responded that the text and statutory context support a broader omnibus reading constrained by the statute’s requirements (an official‑proceeding nexus and a “corruptly” mens rea).

Justices repeatedly posed hypotheticals to test the outer reaches of each reading. They asked whether peaceful but disruptive protests, hecklers in a courtroom, someone pulling a fire alarm, or blockades that delay members from reaching a vote could fall within (c)(2). General Prelogar said that practical limits — proving a specific nexus to an official proceeding and proving the defendant acted “corruptly,” i.e., with consciousness of wrongdoing or unlawful means — would limit prosecutions so that trivial or de minimis disruptions would not become federal felonies.

The government also emphasized empirical constraints: it told the Court that, while more than 1,350 defendants have been charged in connection with January 6, only a subset have been prosecuted under §1512(c)(2) when evidence supported the statutory elements. The office described sentencing outcomes for defendants convicted solely under (c)(2) as generally far below the statutory maximum, with average and median months of incarceration substantially lower than 20 years.

Petitioner’s rebuttal warned of chilling effects if the Court accepted a broad reading that could sweep in peaceful advocacy, lobbying or even civil‑litigation conduct, and reiterated that the Court should reverse the D.C. Circuit’s decision below.

The argument left key interpretive tensions unresolved: whether the word "otherwise" imports the object‑and‑verb constraints of (c)(1) into (c)(2), or whether (c)(2) stands as a textual omnibus that criminalizes other modes of obstructing official proceedings subject to the statute’s nexus and mens rea elements. The case was submitted for decision.